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INTRODUCTION
Genomic research is at an impasse. In the decade since the
completion of the first draft of the human genome, progress has
been made, but few of the grandest promises of genomics have
materialized. Biomedical researchers largely agree that one
critical thing is essential to propel genomics into the future and
maintain its legitimacy: more bodies. This Article will examine
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recent efforts at massive recruitment of subjects to participate
in biomedical research and will argue that such efforts, while
clearly motivated by a desire to drive biomedical research to its
next stage of promised critical breakthroughs, also promote a
privatized conception of citizenship that configures citizens’
duties as serving the public good primarily through serving the
good of private corporations—pharmaceutical manufacturers in
particular. This reconfiguration of citizenship, in turn,
implicates the allocation of related public resources to support
drug development.
This Article explores the tacit interconnections among five
major federally sponsored biomedical initiatives of the past
decade in order to illuminate critical aspects of the current
drive to get bodies. The initiatives are: 1) a multi-year study
conducted for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by the
Genetics and Public Policy Center (GPPC) at Johns Hopkins
University to examine methods of effectively recruiting subjects
to a national biobank;1 2) the passage of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in 2008;2 3) the
Million Veteran Program (MVP), an initiative of the
Department of Veterans Affairs to enroll one million veterans
in a massive federal biobank to promote biomedical research;3
4) the July 2011 publication by the Department of Health and
Human Services of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) to reconsider the “Common Rule” regulating the
protection of human subjects in research;4 and 5) the creation,
in 2011, of the National Center for Advancing Translation
Science (NCATS) at the NIH, which aims to develop
collaborative relationships with industry to “de-risk” early
stage drug research and bridge the “valley of death” between
bench science and the actual production of valid therapeutic
interventions.5
1. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 152–55 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 379–82 and accompanying text.
4. See infra note 413 and accompanying text.
5. Francis S. Collins, Reengineering Translational Science: The Time Is
Right, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., July 6, 2011, at 5 (“Through partnerships
that capitalize on our respective strengths, NIH, academia, philanthropy,
patient advocates, and the private sector can take full advantage of the
promise of translational science to deliver solutions to the millions of people
who await new and better ways to detect, treat, and prevent disease.”); NAT’L
CTR. FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., TRANSFORMING TRANSLATIONAL
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Framing these initiatives are calls from prominent federal
actors for citizens to participate as research subjects to serve
the public good of improving health, as they might serve on a
jury or in the military.6 What these arguments elide, however,
is that where jury duty directly serves the polity, participation
in research directly serves corporations seeking to develop new
biomedical products and only indirectly (if at all) promotes the
public good. As recruitment efforts privatize citizenship to
serve corporate interests, NCATS privatizes the research
resources of the federal government, essentially socializing the
risk of drug discovery, to serve corporate interests7—all in the
name of serving the “public good” of health.8 In this model,
corporations become essential mediators of the public good. The
model also creates a fundamental asymmetry wherein citizens
bear duties, the government carries risk, and private
corporations reap the commercial benefits without any
concomitant duties or obligations.9 Indeed, by law corporations
have only one duty—to maximize return to their investors.10
Along with the proposed new duties of citizenship, this
Article will also explore themes of risk and potential as they
intersect, construct, and inform relations among these diverse
federal initiatives. Risk, as Ulrich Beck has argued, is a key
organizing concept of modernity.11 Risk is also a central concept

RESEARCH 2 (2013), available at http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/factsheet.pdf
(providing that NCATS is developing collaborations across different scientific
organizations which have been traditionally distinct).
6. See infra notes 215–18 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 542–45 and accompanying text; see also Collins, supra
note 5, at 2 (describing how NCATS’s “new scientific approach” will “count on
the scientific community to conceive highly innovative ideas” and then fund
those proposed programs through the NIH grant system).
8. See Collins, supra note 5, at 5 (“[L]et us embark on this new
adventure with eyes wide open . . . fixing our vision on the possibility of
profound benefits for humankind.”); infra notes 512–14 and accompanying
text.
9. See infra notes 358–60 and accompanying text.
10. Cf. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory
of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 686–717, 705 (2004)
(providing a historical view of corporate directors’ fiduciary duties to investors
and finding that, at least for some scholars, “[t]he traditional law and
economics approach to the maximands issue holds simply that the
shareholder-value-maximization rule is (1) efficient and (2) workable,” but
noting that this viewpoint is susceptible to criticism).
11. ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 19 (Mark
Ritter trans., SAGE Publications 1992) (1986).
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in biomedicine,12 informing NCATS’s approach to translational
research and providing a foundation for the ethical and
regulatory guidelines structuring human subject research.13 As
political scientist Jacob Hacker has argued, risk also critically
mediates current debates over the proper roles of public and
private spheres in governing critical social and economic goods
such as health care.14 This is, in part, because there are basic
value judgments embedded in defining what counts as risk, an
act which, as Paul Slovic notes, is “an exercise in power.”15
Potential, particularly in the domain of biobanking and
drug development, has been widely invoked to make demands
upon individuals and society in diverse contexts to help realize
the great promise of modern biomedicine.16 It is in many
respects the flip side of risk—presenting visions of hope and
expectation rather than concern or apprehension.17 Potential is

12. Claus Møldrup & Janine Marie Morgall, Risk Society—Reconsidered
in a Drug Context, 3 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 59, 72 (2001) (“[R]isks associated
with modern drugs are . . . capable of producing risk on an objective as well as
on a non-objective global level.”); Bryan S. Turner, Risks, Rights and
Regulation: An Overview, 3 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 9, 9 (2001).
13. Jonathan Kimmelman, Valuing Risk: The Ethical Review of Clinical
Trial Safety, 14 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 369, 369 (2004) (“The ethical
conduct of research involving human subjects demands that risks to
participants and society be minimized through independent review,
monitoring, and possible revision of research proposals.”); Peter H. Van Ness,
The Concept of Risk in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects, 15
BIOETHICS 364, 366 (2001) (“It is especially evident in the context of
biomedical research involving human subjects that benefits are intended and
harms are not.”).
14. Jacob S. Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare
State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States,
98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 243, 246 (2004) (“[T]he emergence of risk-benefit
mismatches should itself be seen as a process that is highly mediated by
politics.”). See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT 39–57
(2006) [hereinafter HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT] (describing the history of
public social insurance in the United States).
15. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the
Risk-Assessment Battlefield, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 689, 689 (1999); see also
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON 132–49, 156–60 (2012)
(discussing the concept of risk as it mediates between knowledge and power
and asserting a hybrid nature of risk assessment and risk management as
always necessarily involving value judgments as well as technical analysis).
16. See, e.g., infra Part X (describing how NCATS and other federally
sponsored initiatives seek to realize the potential of genomic medicine).
17. MICHAEL FORTUN, PROMISING GENOMICS: ICELAND AND DECODE
GENETICS IN A WORLD OF SPECULATION 10 (2008) (“Genomics must be
analyzed in terms of the promise, because promise is an ineradicable feature
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invariably connected to successive hyperbolic claims made on
behalf of the progress of biomedical research.18 This is perhaps
best exemplified by the speeches made at the White House
Ceremony announcing the completion of the first rough draft of
the human genome in June, 2000. Here, President Clinton
declared, “[i]n coming years, doctors increasingly will be able to
cure diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, diabetes and
cancer by attacking their genetic roots.”19 Prime Minister Blair
characterized the draft as “a breakthrough that opens the way
for massive advances in the treatment of cancer and hereditary
diseases, and that is only the beginning.”20 Craig Venter, then
of Celera Genomics, attended the ceremony and was similarly
enthused that with knowledge from the genome, we now had
“the potential to reduce the number of cancer deaths to zero
during our lifetimes.”21
Promise and potential are often invoked side by side in
such declarations, but for the purposes of this Article, I would
like to make a distinction between the two. Here I will be
considering promise as relating more to the commercial aspects
of biomedicine and related therapeutic interventions, while the

of genomics.”); ADAM HEDGECOE, THE POLITICS OF PERSONALISED MEDICINE:
PHARMACOGENETICS IN THE CLINIC 17 (2004) (“One of the most important
ways in which expectations about personalized medicine are being constructed
is through the deployment of technological visions.”); Richard Tutton, Banking
Expectations: The Promises and Problems of Biobanks, 4 PERSONALIZED MED.
463, 463 (2007) (“Analysts of science and technology have recently paid
attention to how expectations, hopes and visions of the future are central to
the dynamics of innovation in emerging technologies . . . .”). For a foundational
essay on the anthropology of potential and its relation to risk, see Karen-Sue
Taussig, Klaus Hoeyer & Stefan Helmreich, The Anthropology of Potentiality
in Biomedicine: An Introduction to Supplement 7, 54 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY S3 (2013).
18. Tutton, supra note 17, at 467 (providing that some epidemiologists,
disease
advocacy
organizations
and
commercial
companies
are
“overwhelmingly positive” about the potential and impact of biobanks).
19. Remarks on the Completion of the First Survey of the Human
Genome, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1267, 1268 (June 26, 2000).
20. Press Release, The White House, Remarks Made by the President,
Prime Minister Tony Blair of England (via satellite), Dr. Francis Collins,
Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, and Dr. Craig
Venter, President and Chief Scientific Officer, Celera Genomics Corporation,
on the Completion of the First Survey of the Entire Human Genome Project
(June 26, 2000) [hereinafter Human Genome Project Remarks] (on file with
the National Human Genome Research Institute), available at
http://www.genome.gov/10001356.
21. Id.
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concept of potential is more often located in the objects of
scientific study themselves—whether particular molecules or
entire bodies. Promise generally invokes a commitment to
provide a certain good or service to a promisee, often in return
for a particular action or other form of support. Potential, with
the linguistic root potentia (Latin, meaning “power, might,
force”),22 is characterized more by a sense of latent power. In
contrast to the commitments made by a promisor, those
invoking potential make demands upon others in order to
actualize its latent power. This is an admittedly crude and
overly dichotomous characterization of the terms that in
practice are often used interchangeably, but I find it
heuristically useful.
This Article will consider how tropes of risk and potential
are deployed in efforts to reshape existing notions of public
citizenship into emergent new understandings of citizenship as
“privatized”—that is, as serving not only the public good but
also private interests, particularly of drug developers, hoping to
bring new products to market. As recruitment efforts privatize
citizenship to serve these interests, the Article will consider
how NCATS may be privatizing the research resources of the
federal government, essentially socializing the risk of drug
discovery, similarly in the name of serving the “public good” of
health.
On the one hand, it can be argued that promoting
collaborative public/private research enterprises that produce
innovative therapeutics is a clear good. On the other hand,
where such initiatives involve the intersection of commercial
interests with federal resources and new characterizations of
the nature and duty of citizenship, it is imperative to consider
some of the broader implications they might have, not only for
biomedical innovation, but also for broader understandings of
citizenship, risk, and the common good in a post-genomic age.
I.

GETTING BODIES

In 1990, the U.S. government embarked on a major longterm project to map the human genome.23 The human genome
22. Latin Definition for: Potentia, Potentiae, LATDICT LATIN DICTIONARY
& GRAMMAR RESOURCES, http://www.latin-dictionary.net/definition/31066/
potentia-potentiae (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
23. Human Genome Project, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://report.nih.gov/
NIHfactsheets/ViewFactSheet.aspx?csid=45&key=H#H (last updated Mar. 29,
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is comprised of some three billion base pairs of the chemical
nucleotides: adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine.24 Among
the chief aims of the Human Genome Project (HGP) were to
determine the actual sequence of the base pairs and identify all
the genes (portions of the genome that code for the production
of proteins), in human DNA.25 Alternately framed as reading
the “book of life”26 or cracking the “code of codes,”27 among
many other grand metaphors, the HGP soon became imbued
with great hopes and promises for improving the human
condition.28 Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee noted early on
that DNA itself had become enveloped in a “mystique” of
complex cultural meanings that deeply shaped broader social
attitudes toward the HGP and related endeavors.29
As the original plan for the first five years of the HGP
stated:
The information generated by the human genome project is
expected to be the source book for biomedical science in the 21st
century and will be of immense benefit to the field of medicine. It
will help us to understand and eventually treat many of the more
than 4000 genetic diseases that afflict mankind, as well as the
many multifactorial diseases in which genetic predisposition plays
an important role.30

The HGP itself formally came to a close in April 2003,31 nearly
three years after the triumphant announcement by President
2013) (providing key facts and a timeline related to the Human Genome
Project).
24. Richard B. Hallick, Introduction to DNA Structure, U. ARIZ. (1995),
http://www.blc.arizona.edu/molecular_graphics/dna_structure/dna_tutorial.ht
ml.
25. See Human Genome Project, supra note 23; The Human Genome
Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES.
INST., https://www.genome.gov/11006943 (last visited Mar. 20, 2014).
26. See, e.g., LILY E. KAY, WHO WROTE THE BOOK OF LIFE?: A HISTORY OF
THE GENETIC CODE 1 (Timothy Lenoir & Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht eds., 2000).
27. See, e.g., THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy E. Hood eds., 1992).
28. See, e.g., Human Genome Project, supra note 23 (“[A] deeper
understanding of genetics will shed light on more than just hereditary
risks . . . .”).
29. DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON (1995).
30. DEP’T OF ENERGY & NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, UNDERSTANDING OUR
GENETIC INHERITANCE: THE U.S. HUMAN GENOME PROJECT: THE FIRST FIVE
YEARS, FISCAL YEARS 1991–1995, at vii (1990).
31. A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/18016863 (last updated Oct. 19, 2011).
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Clinton of the completion of a “working draft” of the human
genome at a much-publicized White House Ceremony in June
of 2001.32
The problem was that, while a remarkable technical
achievement, by 2003 the HGP had yet to make significant
progress toward realizing its original great promise of finding
new cures for disease.33 Thus, fast on the heels of the
completion of the HGP, researchers, clinicians, and prominent
government actors were calling for new initiatives to continue
the march toward the promised land of genomic medicine.34 In
2004, Francis Collins, then Director of the National Human
Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) (later to be elevated to
Director of the NIH under President Obama),35 reported on a
December 2003 meeting at the NIH discussing the need for a
massive longitudinal study of up to 200,000 people to further
develop information needed to treat disease.36 Collins noted
that if the experts agreed on the need for such a population
based cohort study, “then we must collectively seek ways to
organize and implement it quickly and efficiently—or face the
real possibility that a decade from now the promise of genetic
and environmental research for reducing disease burden on a

32. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
33. See generally A Brief Guide to Genomics, supra note 31 (“It is
important to realize, however, that it often takes considerable time, effort, and
funding to move discoveries from the scientific laboratory into the medical
clinic. Most new drugs based on genome-based research are estimated to be at
least 10 to 15 years away.”).
34. Since the HGP, there has been a steady succession of new grand
promises being made on behalf of new technologies in a march toward an everreceding horizon of biotechnological nirvana. See, e.g., Jonathan Kahn,
Synthetic Hype: A Skeptical View of the Promise of Synthetic Biology, 45 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2011) (“As the initial promises from the HGP failed to
materialize, successive new rounds of hype followed: Stem cell therapies would
make the blind see and the lame walk; pharmacogenomics would provide
individualized therapies to tailor medicines directly to your personal genetic
profile; Genome Wide Association Studies (‘GWAS’) would unravel the
mysteries of common complex diseases such as diabetes; new initiatives, such
as the Personal Genome Project would provide the sort of information we
originally thought to glean from the HGP; the epigenome would provide the
answers to how the genome really worked; and so on, and so on.”).
35. David Brown, Obama Picks Francis Collins as New NIH Director,
WASH. POST (July 8, 2009, 9:41 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/08/AR2009070802769.html.
36. Francis S. Collins, The Case for a U.S. Prospective Cohort Study of
Genes and Environment, 429 NATURE 475, 476 (2004).
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population basis will remain out of reach.”37 Collins was
arguing that to truly realize the promise of genetic research,
what was really needed was bodies, lots of bodies, at least
200,000 bodies for the one study he was discussing in this
paper.38 Bodies were so important that failure to get them
could place the entire genomic enterprise, begun by the HGP,
at risk.39
Here, at the outset, Collins placed a certain type of risk at
the center of his call for genomic innovation: a risk of lost
potential and lost hopes.40 Collins also bound together
recruitment, risk, and potential in a manner that placed the
obligation for realizing continued progress on forces outside of
the scientific enterprise of genomics itself, into the social and
political world where responsibility for the logistics of realizing
such a large-scale population cohort study would inevitably
fall.41
Two years later, when further making the case for largescale prospective cohort studies, Collins and others asserted
that:
The sequencing of the human genome and increased
investigation of its function are providing powerful research tools
for identifying genetic variants that contribute to common
diseases. Recognition is growing, however, that genetic variants
alone cannot account for most cases of chronic disease. It is far
more likely that environmental and behavioural changes, in
interaction with a genetic predisposition, have produced most of
the recent increases in chronic disease, and might therefore be the
key to reversing this trend.42

The HGP was all well and good, but it was conducted primarily
in laboratories and involved deriving the complete sequence for
only one prototypical genome.43 Identifying genes alone, it

37. Id. at 477.
38. Id. at 476 (“These shortcomings could be addressed by a longitudinal
study of 200,000 people.”).
39. Id. at 477.
40. Id. at 476 (“[T]he probable presence of different environmental risk
factors, and the potential for limited access to data and biological materials
make it unlikely that the current cohort projects will be adequate for the
needs of the United States.”).
41. Id.
42. Teri A. Manolio et al., Genes, Environment and the Value of
Prospective Cohort Studies, 7 NATURE 812, 812 (2006) (internal citations
omitted).
43. See Human Genome Project, supra note 23.
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turned out, did not carry us very far down the road toward the
promised land of genomic medicine.44 The thinking now was
that to fully understand the complexity of the geneenvironment interactions that contributed to most common
diseases, scientists would need to study large numbers of
genomes in context in order to pick up the many small effects
that cumulatively might play a significant role in determining
health outcomes.45
Getting bodies is complicated. There are already multiple
population cohort studies that have been ongoing in the United
States for many years.46 Prominent among these are the
Framingham Heart Study47 and the Jackson Heart Study.48
The Framingham Study originally recruited 5209 white men
and women between the ages of thirty and sixty-two from the
town of Framingham, Massachusetts, and tracked them for
decades to study common patterns related to the development
of cardiovascular disease.49 The study enrolled new generations
of participants in 1971 and again in 2002.50 The Jackson Study
began in 1999 and recruited 5301 African Americans in and
around Jackson, Mississippi.51 It focuses on identifying factors
that contribute to the much higher incidence of cardiovascular
disease in African American populations.52 These significant
studies have produced valuable information but operate at a
much smaller scale than that contemplated earlier by Collins.53
Indeed, later in 2004, an NIH panel of experts recommended
that a population of 500,000 would be optimal for the sort of
44. See Kahn, supra note 34, at 1346–53.
45. Manolio et al., supra note 42, at 813 (summarizing the advantages of
cohort studies that can better identify genetic risk factors and markers).
46. Id.
47. FRAMINGHAM HEART STUDY, http://www.framinghamheartstudy.org
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
48. JACKSON HEART STUDY, https://www.jacksonheartstudy.org/jhsinfo
(last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
49. History of the Framingham Heart Study, FRAMINGHAM HEART STUDY,
http://www.framinghamheartstudy.org/about/history.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2014).
50. Id.
HEART
STUDY,
https://
51. For
Researchers,
JACKSON
www.jacksonheartstudy.org/jhsinfo/Researchers/tabid/122/Default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 8, 2014).
52. JACKSON HEART STUDY, supra note 48.
53. Collins envisioned a “longitudinal study of 200,000 people.” Collins,
supra note 36, at 477.
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large-scale prospective study discussed by Collins.54 This
marked an entirely different scale of research. In ambition it is
more akin to one of the national DNA biobanks being developed
by such countries as Britain, Japan, and Estonia, among
others.55 Accordingly, the NHGRI’s plans for a prospective
large
population
study
(LPS)
demanded
extensive
consideration of both the logistics and ethics of recruitment.56
Such considerations clearly animated the NHGRI’s
decision in 2006 to award $2 million to the Genetics and Public
Policy Center (GPPC) at Johns Hopkins University to engage
in a two-year cooperative Public Consultation Project (PCP) on
public attitudes toward participating in a possible large-cohort
study of genetic and environmental contributors to health.57
Dubbed, “Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on
Genetics, Environment, and Health,” the project came to
54. NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH,
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR A POTENTIAL UNITED STATES POPULATIONBASED COHORT TO DETERMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GENES,
ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH: RECOMMENDATIONS OF AN EXPERT PANEL 6–7
(2005) [hereinafter COHORT REPORT], available at http://www.genome.gov/
Pages/About/OD/ReportsPublications/PotentialUSCohort.pdf (explaining that
the panel also looked at sample sizes as large as 1,000,000 participants); see
Manolio et al., supra note 42, at 818.
55. Richard Tutton, Constructing Participation in Genetic Databases:
Citizenship, Governance and Ambivalence, 32 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 172,
172 (2007). A report from a public meeting of the U.K. Biobank Ethics and
Governance Council provides a useful, succinct description of a biobank:
Originally, and often still now, the term “biobanks” refers to
collections of biospecimens which are available for some dispersive
use (as compared with archival reference use). More recently the term
has come to include collections of biospecimens along with related
health and/or social information to be used in research. Often these
biobanks are accumulated in the course of clinical care, and are often
closely held by those who created the collection. The most robust
contemporary definition of ‘biobanks’ is “rich collections of data plus
biospecimens, specifically developed as resources for research”.
UK BIOBANK ETHICS & GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, REPORT: PUBLIC MEETING OF
THE UK BIOBANK ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 1 (2007), available at
http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk/stellent/groups/egc/@msh_grants/documents/
web_document/wtx041249.pdf.
56. COHORT REPORT, supra note 54, at 5 (providing that surveys and focus
groups could help to obtain input on recruitment approaches which then will
define expectations about the consent process and privacy protections).
57. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics,
Environment, and Health, JOHNS HOPKINS U. GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y
CENTER, http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.consult.gene.php (last visited Feb. 8,
2014).
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involve focus groups, community leader interviews, and town
halls in five U.S. cities, as well as a 4000-person national
survey.58 It also developed educational materials to provide
background information for the various targets of
engagement.59 In the years that followed, the GPPC, under the
direction of Kathy Hudson,60 came to play a central role in
furthering the federal government’s efforts to get bodies for an
LPS.
Increasing pressure to enroll participants throughout
biomedical research has brought into being what sociologist
Steven Epstein has characterized as “a new science . . . that
might be called ‘recruitmentology.’”61 While applicable to a
broad array of recruitment practices and actors for diverse
projects (ranging from small observational studies at academic
health centers to large multinational clinical trials for drug
development), Epstein notes that “[p]ractitioners of
recruitmentology seek to produce and disseminate knowledge
about how to successfully recruit and retain participants.”62 In
contrast to the science of clinical trials, which evaluates the
efficacy of therapies, Epstein posits that the “science of
recruitmentology evaluates the efficacy of techniques necessary
to get bodies into a trial in the first place, and to keep them
there throughout the life of the experiment.”63 The GPPC
efforts on behalf of the NHGRI in laying the groundwork for an
LPS fall squarely under the rubric of recruitmentology. Indeed,
for the GPPC, identifying “the best recruitment strategies” was
a central concern of its PCP.64
The NHGRI came to the GPPC because, prior to
undertaking an initiative as massive as a 500,000-person LPS,
it understandably wanted to gauge public attitudes about and

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. GPPC at Five, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CENTER (Apr. 18, 2007),
http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.enews.article.nocategory.php?action=detail&ne
wsletter_id=21&article_id=81 (reflecting on Kathy Hudson’s work at the
GPPC).
61. Steven Epstein, The Rise of “Recruitmentology”: Clinical Research,
Racial Knowledge, and the Politics of Inclusion and Difference, 38 SOC. STUD.
SCI. 801, 802 (2008).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 803.
64. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics,
Environment, and Health, supra note 57.
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willingness to participate in such a project.65 The PCP involved
focus groups and “town halls” conducted in diverse locations
across the country.66 At sixteen focus groups in six cities, GPPC
representatives showed participants a video explaining the
proposed LPS, and then discussed whether the study should be
done and what factors would influence their willingness to
participate.67 Following the focus groups, the GPPC conducted
twenty-seven individual interviews about the proposed study
with community leaders in the same locations.68 The GPPC
used the information derived from the focus groups and
interviews to shape the subsequent town hall meetings and the
design of a national survey.69
The GPPC held five town hall meetings in 2008 in Jackson,
Mississippi;
Kansas
City,
Missouri;
Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Phoenix, Arizona; and Portland, Oregon (the
same cities where it conducted the focus groups).70 The
meetings had audiences ranging from 76 to 134 people.71 The
GPPC made efforts to have the participants roughly match the
demographics of their local communities.72 Each meeting began
with a presentation by a “senior member” of the GPPC staff,
who welcomed the participants and explained that the PCP
was hoping to “gather feedback on a proposed large-cohort
government study of genes, environment, and health.”73 The
proceedings were then turned over to be moderated by
Jonathan Ortmans, of the Public Forum Institute, which
describes itself as “an independent, nonpartisan, not-for-profit
organization committed to developing the most advanced and
effective means of fostering public discourse.”74

65. SHAWNA WILLIAMS ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. GENETICS & PUB.
POLICY CTR., THE GENETIC TOWN HALL: PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT RESEARCH
ON GENES, ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH 3, 5 (2009), available at
http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/2009PCPTownHalls.pdf.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4.
74. About, PUB. FORUM INST., http://publicforuminstitute.org/about/ (last
visited Mar. 3, 2014).
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The moderator framed the event with the following three
sets of questions:
1. Do you think the government should create a national biobank?
Why or why not?
2. Would you participate in such a biobank? Why or why not?
3. What conditions need to be in place in order for the biobank to
happen?75

Participants were then shown a nine-minute video discussing
genetic variation and its possible contribution to disease.76 The
video also described how the project planned to collect genetic
samples and data about medical history, diet, lifestyle, and
environmental exposures from up to 500,000 U.S. residents.77
It informed viewers that researchers, both public and private
would have access to this information to study how genes,
environment, and lifestyle contribute to disease.78 During the
course of the video, a female narrator states:
No program large enough to do this has ever been done in the
United States. But other countries have begun studying geneenvironment interactions. Many people in these counties have
given their permission to researchers to take genetic samples. . . .
including Great Britain, Iceland, Estonia, Japan, and Canada.
Here in the United States, the National Institutes of Health and
other federal health agencies have a similar project in mind but it
has not yet been approved or funded. NIH would like to get a lot of
public input before going ahead to make sure U.S. citizens are
comfortable with the project, have a say in how it’s run and are
willing to participate in it.79

There are a few noteworthy aspects to this particular framing.
First, in referring to existing programs in other countries, the
video clearly gives the impression that this is an increasingly
common practice, implying that as others have given
permission, so too would it be reasonable for these participants
to give their permission. Second, in the reference to other
national projects, as opposed to private ones (for example,
projects being developed at the Mayo Clinic80 or Vanderbilt

75. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 4.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Video: The Proposed Study, at 2:44–3:43 (Johns Hopkins Univ.
Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr. 2008) [hereinafter The Proposed Study], available
at http://www.dnapolicy.org/video/tps/index.htm.
80. Mayo
Clinic
Biobank
Overview,
MAYO
CLINIC,
http://
mayoresearch.mayo.edu/mayo/research/biobank (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
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University),81 there is also perhaps an implicit call to
patriotism (at best) or (less positively) to a jingoistic concern
about the United States being left behind in the march of
biomedical progress. Third, the stated concerns to make sure
citizens are “comfortable, . . . have a say . . . and are willing to
participate,”82 while reasonable, may also be problematic.
Comfort and having a say are well and good but they seem
clearly geared toward actualizing the third concern (i.e.,
insuring a willingness to participate).
The focus groups and town halls certainly allow for a
measure of citizen feedback that could shape how the project is
carried out. Having a say implies a measure of power, but the
town halls do not appear to have provided any ongoing
mechanism for citizens to exercise any substantive control over
how the project would be carried out.83 They “have a say” in the
recruitment process but not in the substance of the project
itself.84 Thus, “having a say” appears to be part of the
preliminary process of making potential subjects “comfortable”
so that they will be more willing to participate.85 This fits
squarely within a “sub-genre” of recruitmentology identified by
Epstein as seeking “to determine the barriers that keep
individuals from volunteering.”86
NHGRI Director Francis Collins also makes an appearance
in the video to declare that a big study of hundreds of
thousands will “really give us answers” and serve as “a
discovery engine for everything we need to know about
medicine in the future.”87 Collins’s enthusiasm is
understandable. In many respects he was simply following up
81. D.M. Roden et al., Development of a Large-Scale De-identified DNA
Biobank to Enable Personalized Medicine, 84 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 362, 362 (2008).
82. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:37–3:42.
83. Cf. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 4, 7 (discussing the town hall
meeting process, which focused primarily on determining whether
participants thought the study should move forward and whether the
participants themselves would be willing to participate).
84. Cf. id. at 7 (providing that the town halls included some discussion of
study benefits and burdens, as well as acceptable and unacceptable types of
research).
85. Cf. id. (describing how the researchers sought to uncover what factors
or assurances would make individuals more likely to participate in the
project).
86. Epstein, supra note 61, at 810–11.
87. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:45–4:58.
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on the statements made at the White House ceremony
announcing the completion of the first draft of the human
genome.88 One problem, perhaps, is that those earlier
statements were made at the turn of the millennium, and here,
eight years later, Collins was still looking to the future and
calling for another new venture to keep us on the path toward
the ever-receding horizon of biomedical promise.89
Collins’s remarks also differ from the earlier
pronouncements in two distinct ways. First, Collins’s
statements are made to propel forward a nascent project rather
than celebrate the fruition of an existing one.90 Second, they
are directed at potential research subjects.91 Such remarks
function very differently in the context of recruitment. The
difference may be understood, in part, by considering the
relation between invoking the “promise” of genomics and
invoking its “potential.”92 In his exemplary ethnography of the
ventures of deCODE Genetics in Iceland and the related
creation of Iceland’s biobank (alluded to in the PCP
presentation), Mike Fortun notes that “[t]he language of
promising is a diverse and intricate one, demanding equally
diverse and intricate analyses.”93 While my consideration of
promise here is far more modest than that undertaken by
Fortun, I agree with him that “promising is an ineradicable
feature of genomics.”94 This is so largely because the complexity
88. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
89. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:45–4:58; cf. Kahn, supra note
34, at 1346 (describing the “ever receding horizon of promise”).
90. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 3:45–4:58.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., FORTUN, supra note 17, at 102–13 (highlighting the ways
“promising manifests itself in genomics”); HEDGECOE, supra note 17, at 16–17
(“In these terms, we can see pharmacogenetics . . . as a ‘promissory science’, a
discipline that exists more in the speculations and promises of its supporters
than in terms of scientific results and marketable products.”); Michael
Arribas-Ayllon et al., Promissory Accounts of Personalisation in the
Commercialisation of Genomic Knowledge, 8 COMM. & MED. 53, 53 (2011)
(noting that in the context of direct to consumer genetic test marketing,
“promising information that will empower prevention of common complex
diseases and ensure better quality of life is conflated with promising greater
access to personal information”). On the concept of potential in the life
sciences, see generally Taussig, Hoeyer & Helmreich, supra note 17, at S3–
S12 (suggesting that “anthropologists of the life sciences” should utilize and
work “with the concept of potentiality”).
93. FORTUN, supra note 17, at 9.
94. Id. at 10.
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of contemporary genomics, involving whole genome scans of
large populations and examinations of the complex interactions
of genes, behavior, and environment, is full of uncertainty and
contingencies so that results can only be promised, not directly
forecast.95 Making such promises, as Fortun notes, “speaking
very roughly, entails a mixture of a high degree of speculation,
an avowed commitment stemming from multiple insecure
extrapolations, and bets or gambles placed with a combination
of care and risk.”96
Promises can be influential and do a lot of work in
enlisting resources and propelling an enterprise forward.
Clinton, Blair, and Venter were largely celebrating the
“promise” of genomics in marking the completion of the first
draft of the human genome.97 Generally speaking, once made, a
promise does not further call upon the promisee to be realized.
Promise and potential may often be mixed—“if you fund us, we
will have the potential to cure cancer!”—but when they are, the
promise takes on different valences.98 Potential, with its
connotations of latent power, may require ongoing action from
the promisee to be realized.99 It therefore may make different
sorts of demands than a simple promise. Genomic promises are
often really about potential—about unlocking the latent power
of information stored in the genome to enable us to cure
disease.100 In the context of developing an LPS, diverse actors
invoke this potential to make demands on fellow citizens—in
particular, to demand their participation in research to cure
disease.101 In this context, a decision not to participate is not

95. See id. at 10–11 (discussing the necessity of analyzing genomics “in
the terms of the promise” on account of the complexity and uncertainty
involved).
96. Id. at 10.
97. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Tutton, supra note 17, at 467 (discussing the potential of
biobanks to improve clinical practice and whether “investment in biobanks
will yield the promised results”).
99. See, e.g., FORTUN, supra note 17, at 10–11 (arguing that genomic
corporations are essentially providing promises “to produce future products”
designed to live up to the potential of genomics).
100. See, e.g., Human Genome Project Remarks, supra note 20
(highlighting the “remarkable promise of biomedical research” to cure
disease).
101. See, e.g., Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics,
Environment, and Health, supra note 57 (explaining the necessity of citizen
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simply turning down a proposed bargain as in a promissory
contract (“if you give me this, I promise to give you that”); it is
thwarting scientific progress itself (“if you do not participate,
we cannot realize the potential of genomics to cure disease”).
This, I believe, is evident in the PCP presentation and related
endeavors to recruit subjects into a massive new federally
sponsored LPS and related enterprises.
Returning to Collins’s statement to potential subjects in
the PCP video, it presents the idea that participating in an LPS
will provide researchers with “a discovery engine for everything
we need to know about medicines in the future.”102 This is not a
general declaration about the importance of some abstract LPS;
it is part of a specific appeal to recruit subjects to participate. It
is telling them that their bodies are needed to realize this
vision. In a similar vein, the GPPC’s flyer describing the PCP
opens with the bolded question to the prospective participant:
“Would you volunteer to help solve medical mysteries?”103 By
framing the project as a call to actively “help” it becomes clear
that this is not just about promising future medical advances;
it is making a claim upon individuals to participate, with the
unstated message being that failure to do so places the
realization of the biomedical potential of the LPS at risk.104
“Are you,” the flyer continues, “and a half-million of your
fellow citizens ready and willing to volunteer . . . ? That
question, as well as what incentives would encourage study
participation and what concerns people might have, is at the
heart of the Genetics & Public Policy Center’s Public
Consultation Project.”105 The invocation of citizenship is
particularly striking, connoting, as it does, conceptions of duty
participation in order to obtain the research necessary to understand and fight
complex diseases).
102. The Proposed Study, supra note 79, at 4:45–4:58.
103. Public Consultation Project on Genes, Environment, and Your Health,
JOHNS HOPKINS U. GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CENTER, http://www.dnapolicy.org/
resources/PCPdescription.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter GPPC
Flyer]; cf. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics,
Environment, and Health, supra note 57 (“This project will help determine
what Americans think . . . .”).
104. See GPPC Flyer, supra note 103; Making Every Voice Count: Public
Consultation on Genetics, Environment, and Health, supra note 57 (stating
that without the “participation of hundreds of thousands of volunteers,” the
“research necessary to understand” the complexities of genetic diseases would
not be possible).
105. GPPC Flyer, supra note 103.
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and service to a public good.106 The GPPC is quite clear,
however, that it is also looking for “incentives” to encourage
participation, indicating an understanding that a sort of quid
pro quo might provide a useful complement to claims of civic
duty.107 More fundamentally, this and other statements about
the PCP indicate a tension within its framing and goals.
The GPPC characterized the PCP as an exercise in
“deliberative democracy.”108 The concept of “deliberative
democracy” has been the subject of extensive study and
discussion and may not be readily susceptible to one set
definition.109 But if democracy of any sort involves popular
power and control, the PCP conferred little of this upon
participants. The focus groups, town halls, and survey were
less about seeking public input in order to determine whether a
federally sponsored LPS should go forward, to what ends it
might be directed, or how it might be pursued, than it was
about gathering input on how best to frame a pitch to potential
subjects in order more effectively to recruit them into
participating in the project.110 The moderator followed a set
script that imposed a clear structure for discussion upon the
participants.111 The preset agenda specified limited periods of
discussion on prechosen topics—including “Initial Impressions”

106. See id. (“Are you and a half-million of your fellow citizens ready and
willing to volunteer . . . to try to advance our understanding of how genes and
environment contribute to disease?”).
107. See id. (“[The question of] what incentives would encourage study
participation . . . is at the heart of the [GPPC’s] Public Consultation Project.”).
108. Public Consultation and Engagement, JOHNS HOPKINS U. GENETICS &
PUB. POL’Y CENTER, http://www.dnapolicy.org/policy.consult.php (last visited
Jan. 25, 2014).
109. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Introduction to DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 8–9
(Jon Elster ed., 1998) (providing various definitions of deliberative democracy
used by contributors to the book that “differ widely from one another”); JAMES
S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC CONSULTATION 80 (2009) (conceptualizing deliberative democracy as a
democratic theory which “attempts to combine deliberation by the people
themselves with political equality”); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON,
WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 7 (2004) (defining deliberative democracy as
“a form of government in which free and equal citizens . . . justify decisions in
a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable
and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding
in the present . . . but open to challenge in the future”).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.
111. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 4, 7 (describing the process and
agenda for the town hall meetings).
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(fifteen minutes); “Benefits and Burdens” (thirty minutes);
“Acceptable and Unacceptable Types of Research” (ten
minutes); and “Return of Results” (ten minutes).112 One of the
final sections was titled “Build your own Contract,” a twentyminute period during which participants were to list “elements
that should be included in research agreements between the
researchers and study participants for the proposed study.”113
In this context, “deliberation” was not directed to coming to
an informed, mutually agreed-upon course of action that
empowers participants; it was being used as a tool to elicit
information from subjects about what “incentives” might
encourage them to participate in an LPS, which in turn would
then be used to elicit even greater amounts of (genetic)
information from them (or other prospective participants in an
LPS).114 The structuring frame of such discussions was not
“should we do this?” or “how should we do this?”, but “what do
we need to do to get you to participate?” These questions, of
course, are not mutually exclusive, but the process did not
foster any questioning of the underlying enterprise, serving
merely as a consideration of how to make recruitment to it
more effective. It was, as terms such as “focus group” might
indicate, more an exercise in marketing than democracy.
Such an approach is not unique to the GPPC’s and
NHGRI’s plans for large cohort genomic studies. In his study of
similar focus groups conducted as part of the UK Biobank
Project, Richard Tutton discusses what he terms the “discourse
of participation” in such projects, which he suggests “can be
seen as a[n] . . . institutional response to public ambivalence
toward science and expertise.”115 The idea of seeking
“participants” in research, Tutton observes, is a distinctly
recent phenomenon.116 In the past, subjects were viewed as
passive or expendable.117 Following the aftermath of the
atrocities of World War II, and with the rise of modern
bioethics, subjects became vulnerable and in need of ethical

112. Id. at 7.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 83–86, 110 and accompanying text.
115. Richard Tutton, Constructing Participation in Genetic Databases:
Citizenship, Governance, and Ambivalence, 32 SCI. TECH. HUM. VALUES 172,
172 (2007).
116. Id. at 175.
117. Id.
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protection.118 In the context of biobank recruitment, subjects
are increasingly being cast as “empowered citizens”—
empowered largely with information that enables them to
make free, informed, and rational decisions.119 Tutton argues,
however, that in practice, the “discourse of participation is used
by the institutions behind UK Biobank” to enact a constrained
and impoverished model of participation that is “largely
confined to providing samples and data to the project, with the
likelihood of receiving some general feedback about the
progress and key findings of the research in the future.”120
Nonetheless, alternative approaches have also been tried.
Researchers in Canada devoted considerable attention to
developing models of deliberative democracy for engaging the
public around the creation of the “BC Biolibrary,” which “was
established in 2007 to support biobanking and a broad range of
health research applications that utilize biospecimens in
British Columbia, Canada.”121 In contrast to the GPPC’s town
halls, which conceived of public engagement primarily as a
means to overcome barriers to recruitment, researchers at the
W. Maurice Young Centre for Applied Ethics, University of
British Columbia, clearly stated:
When talking about public engagement, we are not referring to
unidirectional attempts to increase public awareness of certain
aspects of science and technology; nor are we referring to the
measurement of ‘public opinion’ on certain controversial issues.
Rather, we are concerned with mechanisms whereby there can be
meaningful and legitimate public input into policy that involves
dialogue between relevant publics with scientists, policy makers,
and other stakeholders.122

To act on this vision, the BC Biolibrary project took a very
different approach to public engagement. It opted for one single
group of twenty-five Canadians, chosen to represent “the

118. Id.
119. Id. (respecting participation in biomedical research).
120. Id. at 188.
121. Kieran O’Doherty & Alice Hawkins, Structuring Public Engagement
for Effective Input in Policy Development on Human Tissue Biobanking, 13
PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 197, 200 (2010).
122. Id. at 198–99 (providing that similar efforts have also been
undertaken by the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota); see also K.C.
O’Doherty & M.M. Burgess, Engaging the Public on Biobanks: Outcomes of the
BC Biobank Deliberation, 12 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 203, 205 (2009)
(explaining the use of deliberative democracy to foster public engagement in
the BC Biolibrary project).
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diversity of values, life experiences, and discursive styles of the
citizens of British Columbia,” and selected also to give “voice to
individuals and groups that would otherwise not be heard.”123
In contrast to the PCP’s nine minute introductory video, BC
Biolibary prepared a workbook for participants outlining key
areas of ethical concern, including: collection of biospecimens;
initial contact/introducing the biobank to potential donors;
linking samples to personal information; consent; and
governance of biospecimens and associated data.124 In perhaps
the most significant difference from the PCP, participants met
over the course of four days (instead of the PCP’s three hours)
to discuss the issues in depth.125 Discussion facilitators “gave
particular attention to ensuring that all voices were heard and
no views glossed over in the formulation of final
recommendations.”126
This last concern with respect to participants’ voices, while
seemingly self-evident, gains salience in light of the
observations made by anthropologist Karen-Sue Taussig while
at one of the actual GPPC town hall events.127 Taussig speaks
of being haunted by the interactions between a participant and
the moderator at a town hall in Portland, Oregon.128 The
exchange began following the showing of an introductory video
when the participant, whom Taussig calls “Sally,” asked, “If we
participate in this study and you find out we have the breast
cancer gene, are you going to tell us?”129 The moderator evaded
the question because it did not fit in with the preset agenda,
saying: “[T]hat is a really good question and it is one we are
going to come to later. Right now we’d like to hear, based on
what you know, do you think the study should be done?”130
About twenty minutes later the moderator turned to the
question of return of results, but asked the participants to
discuss what kind of research they think people should be able
123. O’Doherty & Hawkins, supra note 121, at 201.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 201–02.
126. Id. at 202.
127. Karen-Sue Taussig, Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological
Association, Fantasies of Human Perfectability: Conceptualizing Potentiality
and the Molecular Medical Toolkit (Nov. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
128. Id. at 6–15.
129. Id. at 10.
130. Id. at 11.
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to do, or not do, with materials in a biobank.131 Participants
began generating a list and Sally, whose hand has been raised,
said: “[S]o, if you have the breast cancer gene are they going to
tell you or not?”132 The moderator responded, saying, “I’ll come
to that in a minute,” and continued to call on people to add to
the list he was generating.133 More discussion ensued, and a
while later Sally once again raised her hand and asked:
“[C]ouldn’t you pay a little extra to get your results?”134 Taussig
notes that at that point “the moderator turns to look at us with
an expression that we read as meaning something like ‘can you
believe she’s asking about this again?’ The response is laughter
from most of the rest of the audience. Nevertheless, the
moderator does generate some discussion about the issue of
getting results back.”135 At the end of the discussion, the
moderator asked the participants to vote yes or no about
whether researchers should try to return relevant information
to biobank participants.136 Taussig relates that at that point,
she looked over to Sally’s table and saw that she was gone.137
The story is haunting, in part, because it seems to conflict
so starkly with the GPPC’s avowed purpose of “making every
voice count” in the public consultation process.138 It also
highlights the degree to which the process was not structured
as a true dialogue, but as a means to elicit information from the
participants.139 This brings us back to Tutton’s observation
that discourses of participation and consultation may primarily
be serving the ends of recruitment rather than
empowerment.140 Such engagement as that provided by the
PCP, however, is only a first step toward recruitment. Indeed,
one of the primary goals of the consultation was to identify
concerns and fears that might be acting as barriers to

131. Id. at 12.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 14.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 14–15.
137. Id. at 15.
138. E.g., Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics,
Environment, and Health, supra note 57.
139. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text.
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participation.141 As it turned out, foremost among these were
concerns over loss of privacy and the related “possibility that
insurance companies might obtain individuals’ genetic
information and use it against them.”142 Many participants also
expressed a strong desire for research results; that is, to have
relevant information discovered from their samples returned to
them.143 GPPC researchers found this particularly noteworthy
in light of the fact that they had the moderator explain to the
participants “that individual research results are usually not
returned to study participants because of logistical burdens.”144
That the moderator provided no similar intervention
regarding the burdens of protecting privacy seems to indicate
an implicit understanding on the part of those framing the
discussion (i.e., the GPPC) that concerns over privacy were
somehow more legitimate and addressable than those involving
return of research results (ROR).145 Indeed, with respect to
privacy concerns, the introductory video made clear that
participants’ information would be “coded to hide their
identities,” but made no mention of ROR or other concerns,
such as commercialization of research results.146 The parallel
GPPC online survey of 4659 people similarly found strong
interest in ROR and observed, “[p]roviding individual research
results is a strong motivation to participate; compensating
participants $200 may increase participation a similar amount.
Incentives, recruitment, and return of results could be tailored
to demographics groups’ interests.”147 In analyzing the costs
and benefits of such measures, the survey concluded “that
providing even limited individual research results or graduated
incentives over time could increase retention and
recruitment.”148
Notably, ROR may impose substantive burdens and
responsibilities on researchers involving the actual content of
141. Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics,
Environment, and Health, supra note 57.
142. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 8.
143. Id. at 9–10.
144. Id. at 9.
145. See id. at 14 (“Town hall participants consistently placed
privacy . . . among their top concerns about the proposed study.”).
146. Id. at 5.
147. David Kaufman et al., Subjects Matter: A Survey of Public Opinions
About a Large Genetic Cohort Study, 10 GENETICS MED. 831, 831 (2008).
148. Id. at 838.
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the information they are deriving from the samples.149 By
contrast, protecting privacy primarily imposes procedural
burdens concerning management of and access to
information.150 These are real burdens, but they do not
materially implicate the way research itself is conducted. That
is, ROR involves concerns about what researchers themselves
are doing with the data, whereas privacy concerns primarily
involve insuring that other people (e.g., non-researchers) do not
have access to the data.151 Perhaps more to the point, concerns
over privacy were soon to be addressed by legislation that
imposed little burden on researchers but promised to greatly
alleviate concerns over privacy as a potential barrier to
recruitment.
II. GINA: LAW AS AN ADJUNCT TO RECRUITMENT
The 2008 GPPC report on the town halls highlighted the
passage of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
2008 (GINA) in May of that year.152 The law has two major
components: Title I, which prohibits group and individual
health insurers from using a person’s genetic information in
determining eligibility or premiums and from requesting or
requiring that a person undergo a genetic test;153 and Title II,
which prohibits employers from using a person’s genetic
information in making employment decisions, such as hiring,
firing, job assignments, or any other terms of employment, and
from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information
about persons or their family members.154 GINA does not cover

149. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 9 (stating the logistical
burdens placed on researchers regarding the return of research results).
150. See, e.g., id. at 12, 14 (providing the obligation of researchers to
protect a participant’s privacy and against the misuse of information).
151. Cf. id. at 14 (discussing participant concerns that law enforcement
agencies, pharmaceutical companies, or insurance companies might obtain
and exploit individuals’ data).
152. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42
U.S.C.); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 14 (providing a brief summary of
GINA).
153. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, tit. 1; S. REP. NO. 110-48,
at 2–3 (2007).
154. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, tit. 2; S. REP. NO. 110-48,
at 4–5.
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life, disability, long-term care insurance, or veterans seeking
“health care through the Department of Veterans Affairs.”155
GINA had its roots in legislation introduced thirteen years
earlier by Representative Louise Slaughter that garnered
bipartisan support but did not pass.156 Similar legislation was
introduced during subsequent congressional sessions as the
HGP moved toward its completion in 2003.157 Between 1996
and 2002 the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions held five hearings on genetic discrimination, but
no progress was made toward enacting specific legislation.158 In
2003, just as the HGP was coming to a close, Representative
Slaughter and Senator Olympia Snowe introduced the first
bills with the title “Genetic Information Non-Discrimination
Act.”159 Their efforts continued during subsequent congresses,
but it would take five more years to achieve final passage.160
While always animated by concerns to insure that
advances in genetic technologies could be pursued productively
without being used to discriminate unfairly against individuals
on the basis of their genetic makeup, the need for GINA took on
new valences as it moved toward ultimate passage in 2008.
Roughly coincident with the rising interest in developing a
federally sponsored LPS and the GPPC’s efforts to gauge
citizen attitudes toward participating in such a study, GINA’s
advocates began to emphasize more heavily its potential to
facilitate recruitment of subjects for biomedical research.161
Thus, the GPPC town hall report’s reference to GINA was not

155. Kathy L. Hudson, Genomics, Health Care, and Society, 365 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1033, 1038 (2011).
ALLIANCE,
http://
156. Genetic
Discrimination,
GENETIC
www.geneticalliance.org/advocacy/policyissues/geneticdiscrimination
(last
visited Feb. 8, 2014).
157. See id. (mentioning the nearly thirteen years spent by the Genetic
Alliance to pass GINA).
158. S. REP. NO. 110-48, at 13–14.
159. S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 1, 14–15 (2003) (summarizing the legislative
history of GINA).
160. S. REP. NO. 110-48, at 13.
161. See id. at 1 (“Establishing these protections will allay concerns about
the potential for discrimination and encourage individuals to participate in
genetic research . . . .”).
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incidental, but central to emerging understandings of the
significance of the legislation.162
By the mid-2000s, recruitmentologists of many stripes (i.e.,
all those interested in promoting the broad participation of
citizens in large-scale biomedical research projects) consistently
identified fear, specifically fear of discrimination, as a primary
barrier to recruitment.163 Fear as a barrier to be overcome
became a powerful and pervasive trope in the drive toward the
ultimate adoption of GINA in 2008. In contrast, concerns over
individual well-being had been manifest from Representative
Slaughter’s original legislation in 1995 but never seemed
sufficient to achieve passage of the bill.164 The 1995 bill had as
its stated purpose, “[t]o prohibit insurance providers from
denying or canceling health insurance coverage, or varying the
premiums, terms, or conditions for health insurance coverage
on the basis of genetic information or a request for genetic
services, and for other purposes.”165 When introducing the bill,
Representative Slaughter spoke of the need to “prevent the
potentially devastating consequences of discrimination based
on genetic information,”166 but said nothing there, or in
subsequent remarks, about fears of discrimination as a barrier
to research recruitment.167 The bill itself made no mention of
research.168 Senator Snowe, when introducing her companion
bill, mentioned that “people may be unwilling to participate in
potentially ground-breaking research trials because they do not

162. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 14 (framing GINA as a way to
protect privacy and potential misuse of genetic information, two primary
concerns of town hall participants).
163. Kathy L. Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—The Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2661, 2663
(2008) (“Studies have shown the ‘fear factor’ to be a major obstacle to patients’
participation in research studies that involve the collection of genetic
information.”).
164. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act
of 1995, H.R. 2748, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (emphasizing the protection of
individuals against discrimination, in addition to providing limits on the
collection and disclosure of genetic information).
165. Id.
166. 141 CONG. REC. 36,987 (1995) (statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter).
167. See id. at 36,987–88; see also 142 CONG. REC. 6945–46 (1996)
(statement of Rep. Louise Slaughter).
168. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
1995, H.R. 2748, 104th Cong. (1995).
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want to reveal information about their genetic status.”169 But
the bill itself made no reference to research.170
By 2003, things had changed. That year the Senate held
full hearings on a direct precursor to GINA, introduced again
by Senator Snowe.171 The bill itself, while clearly animated by a
concern to prevent invidious discrimination, also prominently
mentions in its initial statement of findings that the law was
“necessary to fully protect the public from discrimination and
allay their concerns about the potential for discrimination,
thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic
testing, technologies, research, and new therapies.”172 The
Senate report accompanying the bill, opened with a clear
declaration that,
The purpose of this legislation is to protect individuals from
discrimination in health insurance and employment on the basis of
genetic information. Establishing these protections will allay
concerns about the potential for discrimination and encourage
individuals to participate in genetic research and to take advantage
of genetic testing, new technologies, and new therapies. The
legislation will provide substantive protections to those individuals
who may suffer from actual genetic discrimination now and in the
future. These steps are essential to fulfilling the promise of the
human genome project.173

The report here cast GINA as an adjunct to recruitmentology—
a means to overcome the barrier of fear that might obstruct
participation in research.174 As the HGP came to a conclusion,
lawmakers were addressing the perceived need to recruit
individuals into the next phase of the genomic enterprise. By
invoking the “promise of the human genome project,”
lawmakers also made demands on fellow legislators to adopt
the bill or else, by implication, be responsible for frustrating
the potential of genomic medicine.175

169. 142 CONG. REC. 8504 (1996) (statement of Sen. Olympia Snowe).
170. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
1996, S. 1694, 104th Cong. (1996).
171. S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 13–15 (2003).
172. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of
2003, S. 1053, 108th Cong. § 2 (2003).
173. S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 1–2 (2003) (emphasis added).
174. See id. at 1 (including the encouragement of participation in research
in the purpose and summary section of the report).
175. See id. at 1–2 (“These steps are essential to fulfilling the promise of
the human genome project.”).
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This too was not accidental. As debates about GINA
unfolded in the 2000s, critics expressed the view that fears of
discrimination were irrational because there had been little or
no evidence of any significant genetic discrimination, nor would
there likely be any.176 Others had been stating for years that
they saw no problem with certain forms of genetic
discrimination—particularly in the area of insurance, where,
they argued, preventing access to genetic information might
allow individuals to game the system.177 As GINA progressed,
such criticisms threatened to undermine this major rationale
for its passage. They did not, however, weaken the rationale of
using GINA to promote research recruitment. If fears of
discrimination, whether justified or not, were real and
impeding recruitment, then GINA would still be needed to
realize the full potential of genomic medicine.
Many of these views were in evidence in comments
presented to the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics,
Health, and Society (SACGHS) in 2004.178 The Committee was
created in 2002 to explore a broad array of health and societal
issues raised by new genetic technologies and to make
recommendations to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services as needed.179 In the fall of 2004 the SACGHS solicited
176. E.g., Louis P. Garrison et al., A Review of Public Policy Issues in
Promoting the Development and Commercialization of Pharmacogenomic
Applications: Challenges and Implications, 40 DRUG METABOLISM R. 377, 395
(claiming that there is “virtually no evidence of genetic discrimination in the
insurance market”); Mark A. Hall & Stephen S. Rich, Laws Restricting Health
Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information: Impact on Genetic Discrimination, 66
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 293, 293 (2000) (“[W]e found that a person with a
serious genetic condition who is presymptomatic faces little or no difficulty in
obtaining health insurance.”).
177. E.g., Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What is
Wrong with Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1456–59 (2001)
(describing the distortions and disturbances that might result in an insurance
industry denying access to genetic testing results); Richard Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74
B.U. L. REV. 1, 12–13, (1994).
178. See generally SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y,
PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON GENETIC DISCRIMINATION, SEPTEMBER 2004–
NOVEMBER 2004 (2004), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/
reports/Public_Perspectives_GenDiscrim.pdf (compiling comments from the
public and health care professionals on genetic discrimination).
179. See Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and Society
Archives, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-clinical-researchand-bioethics-policy/genetics-health-and-society/sacghs-archives (last visited
Mar. 20, 2014).
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input from the general public and health professionals
specifically on the issue of genetic discrimination, which it
compiled into a compendium that it published later that
year.180 Much of the testimony involved individual stories from
people who had suffered discrimination in insurance or
employment.181 They did not directly connect their stories to
issues of research participation, but were concerned primarily
to show that fear of discrimination was not irrational or
unfounded.182
In contrast, a statement by an executive from Aetna, made
“[o]n [b]ehalf of America’s Health Insurance Plans”183 asserted
that the idea that insurers would use genetic information to
discriminate was a myth.184 Myriad Genetics, whose patents on
breast cancer genes made it a major player in the field of
diagnostic tests, similarly cast fears of discrimination as
unfounded.185 Instead of dismissing such fears as irrational,
however, Myriad insisted they be addressed by “comprehensive
legislation”186 in order “to allow the public to participate in the
benefits of genetic medicine,”187 (i.e., their product). These
sentiments were echoed in the statement from another
diagnostic firm, LabCorp, which asserted that “[t]he benefits of
genetic testing can only be fully realized when the fear of
genetic discrimination, and its actual practice, are eliminated
from the health care system.”188
Participating in the benefits of genetic medicine thus
emerged alongside concern to encourage participation in
research as dual reasons to address fears of discrimination that
180. See generally SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y,
supra note 178 (including emails, letters, meeting minutes, policy statements,
reports, and other records).
181. See, e.g., id. at 2–20 (providing the statements of Heidi Williams,
Phadra Malatek, Rebecca Fisher, Tonia Phillips, and Paula Funk).
182. See, e.g., id.
183. Id. at 109 (providing the statement of Joanne Armstrong, Senior
Medical Director of Women’s Health Aetna).
184. Id. at 114 (arguing that there is “little, if any, empirical evidence that
genetic information has, or is being misused” by insurance companies).
185. Id. at 205 (providing the statement of Gary Martucci, Director of
Strategic Alliances for Myriad Genetics Laboratories, who claimed that “the
insurance coverage barrier ha[d] been effectively eliminated . . . . [but] the fear
of genetic discrimination ha[d] not”).
186. Id. at 207.
187. Id. at 208.
188. Id. at 203.
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exerted force independently of whether such discrimination
actually existed. The Senate report directly juxtaposed fear and
potential as driving frames for GINA.189 The invocation of the
promise of the HGP was forward-looking. Taking advantage of
existing therapies, however, would do little to fulfill the
promise. It was participation in research that the Senate most
clearly identified as essential to realizing the potential of new
genomic knowledge to improve health.190 As the report noted a
few pages on (shifting the frame from “promise” to “potential”):
Despite the apparent conflict between actual discrimination
versus the fear or perception of discrimination, consumers remain
worried that, once acquired by an insurance company or employer,
genetic information could be used in a discriminatory manner.
Such concerns about the misuse of genetics are already hindering
the potential of the human genome project. . . .
Fear of discrimination, or even potential discrimination,
threatens society’s ability to use new genetic technologies to
improve human health and the scientific community’s ability to
conduct research needed to understand, treat, and prevent disease.
And, although there may not be proof of widespread
discrimination, it is difficult to ignore the few, albeit egregious,
cases that have been publicly documented.191

Critically, the report acknowledged that actual discrimination
need not exist as a real threat to individuals to justify GINA.192
The reality of public perception and fear of discrimination
themselves posed a sufficient threat to realizing the potential of
the HGP to warrant legislative action.193 The Senate report
here framed the real threat to be addressed by GINA as fear,
and the threatened subject was not the individual but the
enterprise of genomic medicine itself.
In his 2007 testimony before Congress on GINA, thendirector of the NHGRI, Francis Collins, neatly exemplified this
interweaving of fear as a barrier and a threat:
We stand on the brink of a revolution in healthcare . . . . Yet,
there is a cloud on the horizon and it is a cloud that has been
getting darker and more frightening over the course of the last
more than 12 years, since I have had the privilege of leading the
genome effort and worrying about this issue, and that is that this
189. See S. REP. NO. 108-122, at 8 (2003).
190. Id. at 1–2.
191. Id. at 8.
192. Id.
193. Id. (“Many of the problems outlined in this section stem from the lack
of a comprehensive federal law prohibiting the use of genetic information to
deny health insurance coverage or affect employment status.”).
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kind of genetic information, as valuable as it is, might be used
against people . . . . Unless Americans are convinced this
information will not be used against them, this era of personalized
medicine may never come to pass.194

Collins brackets this statement with the idea of a coming
revolution and a new era in genomics.195 These advances
however, lie on a clouded horizon off in the distance. At first, it
seems that the clouds are the threat of discrimination. In fact,
however, the way to clear the clouds is not by addressing
discrimination per se, but rather by convincing Americans that
they will not be discriminated against. These are two very
different, though obviously related, things. The real cloud on
the horizon, then, or the true threat to realizing the promise of
genomics, is the barrier to participation in research erected by
fears of discrimination. In her testimony before the same
committee, Kathy Hudson was quite explicit about this:
“growing uncertainty and fear threaten the future of genetic
medicine.”196
GINA had broad bipartisan support. It was passed by a
Democratic Congress and signed by the Republican President
George W. Bush.197 The theme of fear enjoyed a similarly wide
embrace. In addition to Democratic Representative Louise
Slaughter and the Republican Senator Olympia Snowe,198
industry and patient advocacy groups also invoked the specter
of fear as an obstacle to progress. For example, the
Personalized Medicine Coalition, representing “a broad
spectrum of more than 225 innovator, academic, industry,
patient, provider and payer communities”199 issued a press
release calling for the passage of GINA because fear of genetic
discrimination was deterring patients from taking advantage of

194. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act: Hearing on H.R. 493
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th
Cong. 12–13 (2007) (statement of Francis Collins, M.D., Director of National
Human Genome Research Institute, National Institutes of Health,
Department of Health and Human Services) (emphasis added).
195. See id. at 12.
196. Id. at 44 (providing the testimony of Kathy Hudson).
197. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, NAT’L
HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/24519851 (last updated
Mar. 16, 2012) (tracking the passage and legislative chronology of GINA).
198. See supra notes 166–67, 169 and accompanying text.
199. About the Personalized Medicine Coalition (PMC), PERSONALIZED
MED. COALITION, http://www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/about (last
visited Jan. 30, 2014).
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clinical care and making them “less willing to participate in
studies that search for linkages between genes and disease, to
enroll in clinical trials for new targeted drugs, or to provide
samples for DNA analysis to optimize their own disease
prevention and treatment.”200
The GPPC clearly echoed this framing of GINA as it
gauged public attitudes toward participation in large-scale
genomic research. For example, in 2007, Kathy Hudson, then
still director of the GPPC (and soon to become Francis Collins’s
Deputy Director for Science, Outreach, and Policy at the
NIH),201 emphasized the importance of using law to overcome
public fear that threatened to impede genomic progress:
Without comprehensive legal protections, the public fears
genetic discrimination, and that fear has negative effects on both
medical research and clinical care. Today, genetics is incorporated
into almost all areas of clinical research, and scientists are
proposing massive population-based studies that will enable them
to identify and distinguish genetic, environmental, and lifestylebased contributors to disease. But many potential research
participants are deterred by the fear that their information could be
used against them by employers or insurers . . . . The
nondiscrimination legislation under consideration would allow
researchers, for the first time, to assure participants that it is
simply against the law for health insurers or employers to use
genetic information to discriminate against them.202

Here, Hudson cast GINA as a recruitment tool that would
allow researchers to increase participation by allaying fears
about discrimination. Further, a GPPC Discussion Guide for
Clinicians explicitly stated that discussing GINA “might help
your patients feel more comfortable about . . . participating in
genetic research.”203
In a similar vein, a 2007 GPPC report found that, despite
clear support for such testing, there was also widespread public

200. Press Release, Personalized Med. Coal., Personalized Medicine
Coalition Applauds Senate Approval of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination
Act
(Apr.
24,
2008),
available
at
http://
www.personalizedmedicinecoalition.org/communications/press-releases/200804-24.
201. See infra notes 509–11 and accompanying text.
202. Kathy L. Hudson, Prohibiting Genetic Discrimination, 356 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2021, 2022 (2007) (emphasis added).
203. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., A DISCUSSION
GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 3 (2010), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/
resources/GINAfinal-discussionguide-3June10.pdf.
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concern about discrimination.204 The survey also found that
“[t]hree in four Americans support laws to ban such
discrimination.”205 The report concluded, much like Collins in
his testimony before Congress, that “[w]ithout such laws, much
of the promise of the Human Genome Project to identify the
causes of disease and promote public health is likely to remain
unfulfilled.”206 The following year, in an article co-authored
with Hudson and M.K. Holohan, Collins noted that “studies
have shown the ‘fear factor’ to be a major obstacle to patients’
participation in research studies that involve the collection of
genetic information.”207 The article went on to quote
Representative Judy Biggert, a co-sponsor of GINA, for the
proposition that, “[t]his bill unlocks the great promise of the
Human Genome Project by alleviating the most common fear
about genetic testing.”208 In this model of genomic progress,
public willingness to participate in research is a sort of latent
resource that needs a new law, GINA, in order to be actualized.
The effectiveness of GINA as a recruitment tool depended on
its status as a formal law, invoking the authority of the state to
reassure recruits and surmount the barrier of their fear of
discrimination.
Perhaps more significantly, the extensive discourse linking
GINA to recruitment locates barriers to genomic progress
external to the enterprise of “science” in the logistical realm of
getting bodies. In this scheme, the complexities or
uncertainties of genomics are not themselves barriers to
progress. Rather, the implicit message is give “science” the
proper resources and it will somehow naturally realize the
great potential of genomics. Here the subtle difference between
promise and potential comes into play as substantive demands
are being made upon actors external to science (e.g., legislators
considering the passage of GINA, or later prospective recruits
to research) to realize its potential. Only through their actions
may the latent potential of genomics be actualized. It is as if

204. JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., U.S. PUBLIC
OPINION ON USES OF GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 1
(2007), available at http://www.dnapolicy.org/images/reportpdfs/GINAPublic_
Opinion_Genetic_Information_Discrimination.pdf.
205. Id. at 3.
206. Id.
207. Hudson et al., supra note 163, at 2663.
208. Id.
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the science were there, ready and waiting but simply in need of
some external ingredient to proceed. In the first phase of the
enterprise, the HGP, the required resources were primarily
monetary. Now, in this second phase the resources are corporeal.
In the world of genomic potential, GINA derived its primary
value from its ability to contribute to mobilizing those bodily
resources into the service of biomedical research.
In these discussions of the future of genomics we have a
progression of identifying and addressing major barriers to
realizing its full potential. First, to move to the next phase of
development after the HGP, researchers need to conduct an
LPS; second, to conduct an LPS they need lots of bodies; third,
to get bodies they need recruitmentologists; fourth,
recruitmentologists cannot get bodies without addressing
subject’s fears of discrimination; fifth, GINA, a piece of
legislation conceptualized long before the need to recruit people
to an LPS, emerges as a ready means to address this fear and
thereby works to make all the preceding steps fall into place.
This scheme casts fear less as a concern to be addressed than a
barrier to be overcome. Its salience derives not from the
likelihood that the fears of discrimination might be realized
and result in harm to individuals but from the certainty that
such fears will obstruct the progression of science if not allayed.
III. CITIZENSHIP: DUTY AS AN ADJUNCT TO
RECRUITMENT
Fear is one type of barrier to recruitment. In many
respects it is relatively straightforward: someone who might
otherwise be willing to participate in a study holds back
because of fear of potential discrimination. GINA emerged as a
potentially effective response. Perhaps an even greater barrier
to recruitment is inertia; that is, motivating individuals to even
consider joining a study in the first place.209 In studies of
specific diseases, individuals with the condition being studied
have a built-in incentive to participate in research—the hope
that knowledge gained may directly improve their lives or
those in the future who share the same condition. This
incentive is so great as to give rise among bioethicists to a
209. Cf. Charles W. Lidz & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Therapeutic
Misconception: Problems and Solutions, 40 MED. CARE (SUPP.) V-55, V-61
(2002) (evaluating potential research subject declination of participation as a
cost to researchers).
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concern for what has come to be known as the “therapeutic
misconception”: the belief among potential subjects that
participating in a research study involving their condition
might actually be a form of treatment.210
An LPS is a different sort of study. It involves the
population at large and is general, not focused on any
particular condition or disease.211 Individuals have no
immediate personal stake in participating.212 Recruiters,
therefore, need some additional means to get people in the
door. The GPPC town halls explored attitudes toward return of
results and monetary payments as possible incentives, but also
appealed to altruism.213 The ideal of serving the common good
can be a powerful motivator for some people, but it is also a
somewhat passive and abstract sort of appeal. Recruiters have
also found a more aggressive adjunct to altruism in recent
appeals to civic duty as a basis for demanding participation,214
particularly for a large-scale enterprise such as an LPS that is
not linked to any specific biomedical advance, such as curing
diabetes, but only to the general promise of biomedical
advance.
In 2009, the year after GINA was signed into law, G. Owen
Schaefer, Ezekiel J. Emanuel, and Alan Wertheimer, all of the
Department of Bioethics at the Clinical Center of the National
Institutes of Health, published an article in JAMA (Journal of
the American Medical Association) titled, The Obligation to
Participate in Biomedical Research.215 Ezekiel Emanuel was

210. See, e.g., G.E. Henderson et al., Clinical Trials and Medical Care:
Defining the Therapeutic Misconception, 4 PLOS MED. 1735, 1736 (2007)
(defining “therapeutic misconception” as existing “when a research subject
fails to appreciate the distinction between the imperatives of clinical research
and of ordinary treatment, and therefore inaccurately attributes therapeutic
intent to research procedures”); Lidz & Appelbaum, supra note 209, at V-55.
211. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 36, at 476 tbl.1 (describing how his
proposed study required “[a] broad range of ages . . . to provide information on
disorders from infancy to old age”).
212. But see infra notes 213–14.
213. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 8 (describing how
participants cited “disease prevention and/or treatment” as the most
important benefits of an LPS).
214. See infra notes 228–34 and accompanying text (outlining the civic
duty argument of C.D. Herrera).
215. G. Owen Schaefer, Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Alan Wertheimer, The
Obligation to Participate in Biomedical Research, 302 JAMA 67, 67 (2009)
[hereinafter Emanuel et al.]. Though not the first author, I refer subsequently
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Chair of the Department, and brother to Rahm Emanuel who
was then President Obama’s chief of staff.216 In a nutshell, the
article argued that, “[b]iomedical knowledge is a public good,
available to any individual even if that individual does not
contribute to it. Participation in research is a critical way to
support an important public good. Consequently, all have a
duty to participate.”217 Recognizing the current “social norm”
where most participants in biomedical research have some sort
of affirmative stake in the outcome (as in those whose own or
family member’s condition is being studied), the article used
the notion of biomedical knowledge as a “public good” to shift
the burden of participation from the equivalent of an “opt-in”
system (“individuals participate only if they have good reason
to do so”) to an “opt-out” system (“individuals should
participate unless they have a good reason not to”).218 This duty
to participate has implications far beyond the possible
implementation of any particular LPS. It frames an entire
approach to situating the citizen in relation to the enterprise of
biomedical research in the United States.
Calling for a duty to participate was not particularly new
or striking in itself, but three things distinguished this article:
first, it came at a time when the energies and attention of a
wide array of genomic researchers, drug developers, and policy
makers were increasingly looking toward large-scale
population-based biobanks as essential to moving genomics
forward from knowledge to application;219 second, it articulated
a distinctive vision of citizenship as a function of participation
in research;220 third, it was co-authored by a prominent NIH
official with direct ties to the White House.221
The Emanuel et al. article falls in a line of recent debate
that dates back at least to a 1984 article by bioethicist Arthur
Caplan titled, Is There a Duty to Serve as a Subject in
to this article as “Emanuel et al.” because Emanuel was the lead official
involved in the research.
216. Ryan Lizza, The Gatekeeper, NEW YORKER (Mar. 2, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/02/090302fa_fact_lizza?currentP
age=all (describing Rahm Emanuel in his role as President Obama’s chief of
staff).
217. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 67.
218. Id. at 70.
219. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 36, at 475–77.
220. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
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Biomedical Research?222 Here Caplan reviewed attempts made
during the previous decade to locate a moral basis for
participation in biomedical research.223 He discussed
arguments by physicians such as Walsh McDemott, Louis
Lasagna, and Leon Eisenberg that the results of biomedical
research are public goods (much as Emanuel et al. would later
argue) and hence require a measure of public participation.224
Caplan then discussed counter arguments by the likes of Hans
Jonas and Charles Fried to the effect that “it is not selfevident” that such results are in fact public goods and that
even if they were, their value does not necessarily outweigh
concerns for personal autonomy.225 Caplan moved on to make
his own argument that biomedical research, particularly in the
context of a research hospital, constituted a sort of “voluntary
social cooperation”226 and that “any competent person who
voluntarily seeks out and takes the benefits of care resulting
from biomedical research can legitimately be said to be a
consenting participant in the enterprise and, thus, the bearer
of a duty to share in the costs of producing the desired
goods.”227
More recent arguments made since the completion of the
HGP include a 2003 article by C.D. Herrera that argued for a
more robust duty to participate, along the lines of jury duty,
which would actually compel people to serve.228 Herrera argued
that such a system could remain responsive to principles of
autonomy and justice “if it centered on broad public education,
community representation, and a lottery-type selection
process.”229 In 2005, Rosamund Rhodes, Director of Bioethics
Education at Mount Sinai School of Medicine, generated much
debate with her article Rethinking Research Ethics, published

222. Arthur L. Caplan, Is There a Duty to Serve as a Subject in Biomedical
Research?, 6 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1 (1984).
223. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 2.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 4.
227. Id.
228. C.D. Herrera, Universal Compulsory Service in Medical Research, 24
THEORETICAL MED. 215, 215 (2003) (describing a “system of full civic
participation”).
229. Id.
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in the American Journal of Bioethics.230 Invoking language of
promise and potential that echoed Francis Collins, Rhodes
asserted that “we stand on the brink of a cascade of insights
into human genetics and the promise of spectacular related
advances in biomedical technology.”231 She went on to assert
that “[w]ithout human subject research, those treatments are
less likely to be available[;]” therefore “reasonable people
should endorse policies that make research participation a
social duty” analogous to paying taxes or jury service.232 Those
who do not participate still benefit from medical advances and
are therefore engaged in morally objectionable free riding.233 In
this scheme, the great promise of biomedical technology
demands the participation of human subjects to be realized.234
The duty derives not simply from shared benefits but also from
a moral imperative to actualize the latent potential of
genomics.
Responding to Rhodes, Robert Wachbroit and David
Wasserman questioned the validity of her analogy to jury
service and focused particularly on the argument about free
riding, questioning the idea that non-participants were
“unfairly benefitting” from the value created by the service of
participants.235 They concluded that “research participation
should be seen as a valuable civic activity, like school tutoring,
volunteer fire-fighting, and neighborhood patrolling. . . . [B]ut
there is no reason to single it out as the subject of a universal
duty.”236 Three years later, Immaculada de Melo-Martín
published A Duty to Participate in Research: Does Social
Context Matter?, in which she directly took issue with Rhodes’s
arguments for a universal duty to participate.237 Central to her
critique was the assertion that Rhodes neglected the context in
which decisions to participate occur or the specific risks of

230. Rosamond Rhodes, Rethinking Research Ethics, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 19
(2005).
231. Id. at 25.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 26.
235. Robert Wachbroit & David Wasserman, Research Participation: Are
We Subject to a Duty?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 48, 48 (2005).
236. Id. at 49.
237. Immaculada de Melo-Martín, A Duty to Participate in Research: Does
Social Context Matter?, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 28, 28 (2008).
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participation the subjects might incur.238 Particularly galling to
de Melo-Martín was the idea that a country such as the United
States, without universal health insurance, might impose
duties to participate upon subjects who might have no access to
the benefits that might result from subsequent research.239
Additionally, she noted that among the key beneficiaries of
such a duty would not be the abstract world of scientific
advancement, but the very material world of multinational
pharmaceutical corporations who would literally capitalize on
the knowledge gained and perhaps control the underlying data
as well.240
Rhodes’s response to de Melo-Martín, In Defense of the
Duty to Participate in Biomedical Research,241 elaborated upon
the free-rider aspects of her previous article, arguing that
“[b]ecause we each expect ourselves and our loved ones to share
in the benefits of future medical advances, at least to some
degree, each of us must participate.”242 Now writing in 2008,
Rhodes also expressly addressed the issue of biobanks and
their role in promoting genetic research. “Looking into the
genetics-informed future,”243 she wrote,
makes the case even more strongly. The expectation is that
researchers will learn a great deal more about the human genome
and the human microbiome and that this new knowledge will allow
medicine to tailor treatments to individuals. These advances
promises [sic] to make medicine more effective and, therefore, more
affordable. The studies, however, will require the development of
biobank and sample bank repositories with the participation of a
tremendous number of subjects. To reap the rewards of advancing
the practice of medicine, broad public participation will be
required.244

Here, Rhodes connected the advance of biomedicine directly to
recruitment for biobanks of the sort that would necessarily
underpin the type of large-scale population study advocated by
Francis Collins and explored by the GPPC. As a complement to
the GPPC’s exploration of willingness and possible incentives

238. Id.
239. Id. at 30.
240. Id. at 31–32.
241. Rosamond Rhodes, In Defense of the Duty to Participate in Biomedical
Research, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 37, 37 (2008).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 38.
244. Id.
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to participate, Rhodes added the idea of duty.245 Rhodes’s use of
the passive voice in the last sentence side steps the issue of
how robust such a requirement might be and who would
enforce it (and how).246 Nonetheless, it is clear in its directive
that the imperatives of actualizing the latent potential of
science (here in the form of the “expectation” and the “promise”
to make medicine more effective) demand “broad public
participation.”247 For Rhodes, as for Collins and the GPPC, it
was all about getting more bodies.
It was on the heels of this exchange that Emanuel et al.
published their article in JAMA. Taking a slightly different
tack from Rhodes, the article carefully distinguished its “public
good” idea from similar arguments calling for participation
based on the market idea of “free riding.”248 As defined by the
authors, free riding “occurs when an individual receives a
benefit that others pay for and takes advantage of the
contributors by refusing to share the burden of obtaining it.”249
While an attractive argument, the authors assert that the idea
of paying one’s fair share is inapposite to participation in
research because “[t]he burdens of participating in biomedical
research that current participants assume are not alleviated
when other individuals participate.”250 Conceiving of
biomedical research as a public good surmounts this problem. A
public good, as defined in the article, has two characteristics:
“First, one individual’s use of that good does not diminish
another’s use of that good; and second, it is impractical to
prevent individuals from using the good.”251 A critique of free
riding involves imposing an obligation based on paying one’s
fair share to relieve current burdens on others. In contrast,
“discharging a public goods obligation makes society better off
in the future,” thus making it more apt to the case of research
participation than the free-rider argument.252
245. Id. (“[W]e are duty-bound to participate in research.”).
246. Id. (“The risk associated with research should also be minimized
through proper oversight of study design so that the expected harms are never
undue and through required insurance to indemnify subjects from harms that
are consequent to their research participation.”).
247. Id.
248. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 67.
249. Id. at 67–68.
250. Id. at 68.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 69.
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As Emanuel et al. conceive it, the obligation to participate
in biomedical research is not so much grounded in a sense of
fairness (as is free riding) as in a duty to society as a whole—a
public duty, “[b]ecause the enterprise of biomedical research
produces the important benefit of medical knowledge that is an
advantage to all, every individual has an obligation to support
that system of knowledge generation by participating in
biomedical research.”253 This obligation, they argue, must be
understood as an attribute of contemporary citizenship in the
United States that demands “a cultural and moral change, not
a legal one.”254 The authors make this connection explicit when
they state that, “[j]ust as many claim that citizens have an
obligation to vote even though they are not legally required to
do so, society should recognize that everyone has an obligation
to participate in research when it is not excessively
burdensome to do so.”255 This new attribute of citizenship, then,
does not involve formal rights and duties (as for example, the
right to equal protection of the laws or the duty to serve on a
jury) but rather a developing normative argument about what
makes a “good citizen”256 in the post-genomic age.
IV. CITIZENS, GOOD CITIZENS, AND BIO-CITIZENS
These largely bioethical discussions of the specific duties of
citizenship in relation to biomedical advancement are
surprisingly
short
on
theorization
or
historical
contextualization of the concept and meaning of citizenship in
American society. Diverse scholars have invested modern
citizenship with an array of attributes and characteristics. In
one typology, Ronald Beiner offers three theoretical
perspectives on citizenship: liberal, emphasizing the individual
and individual rights; communitarian, emphasizing the
cultural or ethnic group and solidarity among those sharing a
history or tradition; and civic republican, emphasizing “civic”

253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 70.
Id.
See generally MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE GOOD CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE (1998) (examining citizenship in the context of American
political life).
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bonds and duties to the polity.257 In one of the most influential
contemporary discussions of citizenship, T.H. Marshall focuses
primarily on rights-based liberal conceptions of citizenship,
which he breaks down into three elements: civil, political, and
social.258 The civil element involves those rights necessary for
individual freedom, such as freedom of speech, thought, and
faith, as well as basic property rights and the right to justice in
a formal legal system.259 The political element involves the
right to participate in the exercise of political power—as
through voting or running for elective office.260 The social
element involves rights to basic economic welfare and “security
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live
the life of a civilized being according to the standards
prevailing in society.”261 Marshall goes on to situate these
rights historically, broadly locating the formative period for
civil rights in the eighteenth century, political rights in the
nineteenth, and social rights in the twentieth.262 Citizenship,
as elaborated through these rights, is a matter of ensuring that
individuals are accorded a status as full and equal members of
society.263
Marshall, however, was primarily concerned with aspects
of citizenship related specifically to rights.264 As Will Kymlicka
and Wayne Norman note, “[c]itizenship is not just a certain
status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is also
an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political
community.”265 As a function of participation in one’s
community, they define citizenship as an activity as well as a

257. Ronald Beiner, Introduction: Why Citizenship Constitutes a
Theoretical Problem in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century, in
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 1, 13–14 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
258. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in INEQUALITY AND
SOCIETY: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 148, 148
(Jeff Manza & Michael Sauder eds., 2009).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 149.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 149–50.
264. Cf. id. But see Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen:
A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 369 (1994)
(arguing that Marshall “saw citizenship as a shared identity that
would . . . provide a source of national [British] unity”).
265. Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 264, at 369.
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status.266 Or as Ruth Lister puts it, citizenship may be
“conceptualized . . . both as a status, carrying a wide range of
rights, and as a practice, involving both obligations and
political participation, broadly defined.”267
The notion of citizenship as a practice has roots in
Aristotle’s Politics, in which, as J.G.A. Pocock notes,
“[c]itizenship is not just a means to being free; it is the way of
being free itself.”268 Aristotle’s model lies at the root of a civic
republican conception of citizenship that developed through a
lineage that includes Machiavelli and Guicciardini in the
Italian Renaissance into British republican thinkers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth century, such as James
Harrington; the model ultimately came to play a signal role in
shaping the ideology of the American Founders.269 Bound up
with ideals of civic virtue, corruption, and decay, Pocock
distinguishes civic republicanism from a second “great Western
definition of the political universe,” expounded by the second
century Roman jurist Gaius, wherein the individual “became a
citizen . . . through the possession of things and the practice of
jurisprudence. . . . A ‘citizen’ came to mean someone free to act
by law, free to ask and expect the law’s protection . . . .
Citizenship has become a legal status, carrying with it rights to
certain things.”270 Here, perhaps, lay the roots of modern
liberal understandings of the citizen as a bearer of legal rights.
Feminist scholars have noted that the liberal subject
historically has been implicitly coded as white and male.271
These critiques focus on the importance of contextualizing the
exercise of citizenship within actual historical communities and
argue that any consideration of citizenship must also involve

266. Id.
267. RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 41 (1997).
268. J.G.A. Pocock, The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times, in
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 29, 32 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
269. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
MOVEMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (2003).
270. Pocock, supra note 268, at 34–36.
271. See, e.g., LISTER, supra note 267, at 66 (“The universalist cloak of the
abstract, disembodied individual has been cast aside to reveal a definitely
male citizen and a white, heterosexual, non-disabled one at that.”).
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an examination of the conditions that make it meaningful.272
Similarly, feminists have challenged civic republican ideals of
citizenship as grounded in an excessively rigid divide between
the public and the private, reason and emotion, the particular
and the universal; in each case, promoting civic ideals that
exclude, deny or degrade women.273
Coming specifically to the case of citizenship in the
American tradition, Michael Schudson focuses on the civic
republican strain of citizenship to explore the evolving norms of
what constitutes a “good citizen.”274 Schudson identified four
historical phases of American civic life, beginning with the
period of the Founders, which he sees as characterized by a
“politics of assent” where the personal authority of gentleman
elites dominated political discourse and action.275 This gave
way in the early nineteenth century to the era of Jacksonian
mass democracy where the interpersonal authority of parties,
coalitions, and electoral majorities ruled the day.276 Early
twentieth-century Progressive Era reformers emphasized an
impersonal educational model of democracy, where the good
citizen was a rational and informed one.277 Finally, since the
post-war civil rights era, the model of the “rights-bearing
citizen” has been dominant in our own time, adding law to
science and expertise as impersonal bases of authority.278
Schudson makes clear that these models are not strictly
sequential but accretive, each layering upon the previous,
perhaps becoming more dominant but never wholly
supplanting earlier models.279
As the title of Schudson’s book, The Good Citizen, makes
clear, he is concerned more with the practice of citizenship than
with status. In contrast, in her study of contemporary
American citizenship, Judith Shklar focuses on the idea of
“standing” arguing that “the struggle for citizenship in America
272. See generally LISTER, supra note 267; CAROL PATEMAN, THE
DISORDER OF WOMEN (1989); Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference:
A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 253–54 (1989).
273. See, e.g., LISTER, supra note 267, at 69; ANNE PHILLIPS, ENGENDERING
DEMOCRACY 46–53 (1991).
274. SCHUDSON, supra note 256.
275. Id. at 5.
276. Id. at 5–6.
277. Id. at 6.
278. Id. at 7.
279. Id. at 5–10.
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has . . . been overwhelmingly a demand for inclusion in the
polity, an effort to break down existing barriers to recognition,
rather than an aspiration to civic participation as a deeply
involving activity.”280 Central to her analysis of the emblems of
public standing are the right to vote and the opportunity to
earn; above all, these are what historically distinguished the
free white man from the black slave.281 The dignity of work and
franchise were the key attributes of full standing in the
American polity.282 Nonetheless, Shklar fully acknowledges
other components to American citizenship. She cites citizenship
as “nationality”—a legal condition;283 as “active participation or
‘good citizenship’”—focusing on practices;284 and the ideal of
“republican citizenship”—where civic virtue requires constant
and direct involvement in ruling and being ruled. 285
Rogers Smith chronicles the darker side of American “civic
ideals” of status and standing, arguing “that U.S. citizenship
laws have always expressed illiberal, undemocratic ascriptive
myths of U.S. civic identity, along with various types of liberal
and republican ones, in logically inconsistent but politically
effective combinations.”286 His “multiple traditions” thesis
holds that these more hierarchical ascriptive ideologies (most
prominently based on race and gender) have always been
blended in with liberal and democratic republican civic
ideologies.287 As a critical complement to Schudson’s analysis of
the historical phases of American civic life, we have Smith
asserting that:
[F]rom Thomas Paine’s identification of European-descended
American men as the new chosen people of the Protestant God, to
the Federalists’ and the Whigs’ Anglophilic nativism, to the
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian doctrines of scientific racism, to the
stark evolutionary theories of racial and gender hierarchies during
the Gilded Age and the Progressive Era, U.S. leaders always

280. JUDITH SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION
3 (1991).
281. Id. at 1–2.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 3–5.
284. Id. at 5.
285. Id. at 11–12.
286. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 470 (1997).
287. Id. at 471–72.
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fostered senses of what made Americans a distinct “people” that
relied in part on inegalitarian ascriptive themes.288

The tapestry of American citizenship is thus complex,
interwoven with many themes and informed by multiple
ideological traditions.
V. CONSTRUCTING CITIZENSHIP IN A
POST-GENOMIC AGE
It is within this context that some significant recent social
science scholarship on modern genomics has begun to explore
its broader implications for contemporary understandings of
Employing
terms
such
as
“Genetic
citizenship.289
“Genomic
Citizenship,”291
“Biopolitical
Citizenship,”290
Citizenship,”292 and “Biological Citizenship,”293 these scholars
examine how the emergence of modern genetics and related
enterprises have been changing individuals’ understandings of
their political identities in relation to themselves, their bodies,
biomedical practices and the state.
Deborah Heath, Rayna Rapp, and Karen-Sue Taussig
coined the term “genetic citizenship” to describe an emergent
288. Id. at 471.
289. See, e.g., Bruce Jennings, Genetic Literacy and Citizenship:
Possibilities for Deliberative Democratic Policymaking in Science and
Medicine, 13 GOOD SOC’Y 38 (2004); Anne Kerr, Rights and Responsibilities in
the New Genetics Era, 23 CRITICAL SOC. POL’Y 208, 209 (2003).
290. See, e.g., Deborah Heath et al., Genetic Citizenship, in A COMPANION
TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF POLITICS 152 (David Nugent & Joan Vincent eds.,
2004).
291. See Janet Elizabeth Childerhose, Genetic Discrimination: Genealogy
of an American Problem 52–53 (Nov. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, McGill
University),
available
at
digitool.library.mcgill.ca/thesisfile86665.pdf
(explaining her use of the “genomic citizenship” construct).
292. STEVEN EPSTEIN, INCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE IN
MEDICAL RESEARCH 116 (2007).
293. See, e.g., ADRIANA PETRYNA, LIFE EXPOSED: BIOLOGICAL CITIZENS
AFTER CHERNOBYL (2002); NIKOLAS ROSE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE ITSELF:
BIOMEDICINE, POWER, AND SUBJECTIVITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
131–54 (2007); Nikolas Rose & Carlos Novas, Biological Citizenship, in
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 439, 439 (A. Ong & S.J. Collier eds., 2008).
Other similar terms include “biomedical citizenship,” João Biehl, The Activist
State: Global Pharmaceuticals, AIDS, and Citizenship in Brazil, 80 SOC. TEXT
105, 130 n.48 (2004), and “therapeutic citizenship,” Vinh-kim Nguyen,
Antiretroviral Globalism, Biopolitics, and Therapeutic Citizenship, in GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PROBLEMS 124 (A. Ong & S.J. Collier eds., 2005).
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phenomenon whereby individuals “connect[ ] discussions of
rights, recognitions, and responsibilities to intimate,
fundamental concerns about heritable identities.”294 Their
analysis takes aim, in part, at the traditional divide between
public and private in classical theories of citizenship.295 Their
notion of citizenship is intimate and involves an ethic of care
that they connect both to Michel Foucault’s notion of
“technologies of the self” and to feminist moral philosophy
emerging from Carol Gilligan’s work on moral development.296
They argue that organizations built around shared genetic
traits, such as the lay advocacy group the Genetic Alliance, are
giving rise to “new forms of democratic participation, blurring
the boundary between state and society, and between private
and public interests.”297 They also note, however, a
phenomenon whereby health advocacy groups that began
grass-roots mobilizing efforts to make demands on the state for
resources and support may become corporatized as they go
national.298 This “corporatization” of grass-roots voluntary
associations, they argue, “represents not merely assimilation
into early twenty-first-century capitalist culture, but also a
strategic intervention, a move to gain access to resources.”299
Janet Childerhose distinguishes her idea of “genomic
citizenship” from Heath, Rapp, and Taussig’s genetic
citizenship by observing that, the latter “describes the claims
for scientific inclusion by marginalized populations with rare
genetic disorders,” whereas genomic citizenship “describes the
geneticization of all Americans by some genetic activists.”300 In
her study of the campaign to pass GINA, Childerhose notes
that these activists, including the same Genetic Alliance
studied earlier by Heath, Rapp, and Taussig, sought to “enroll
everyone into a biosociality of a flawed genome that is being
294. Heath et al., supra note 290, at 157.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 152.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 161. This phenomenon provides an interesting counter-example
to Robert Putnam’s argument in his much discussed book, Bowling Alone, that
American structures of solidarity and community have become increasingly
eroded in the past century, leaving us civically isolated and disconnected. See
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
300. Childerhose, supra note 291, at 336.
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made transparent by researchers. According to these activists,
all Americans are members of the ‘genetics community,’
whether they realize it or not,” because we all have flaws in our
genome.301 Childerhose argues that while this model of
citizenship may appear inclusive and egalitarian, it is actually
coercive in its insistence that “all Americans . . . take
responsibility for their genetic liabilities” and lays the
foundations for discrimination against those who fail to
conform to this norm of good genomic citizenship.302
Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas frame “biological
citizenship” as a more general version of genetic citizenship
and place it in the context of a tradition of “citizenship
projects,” which they define as “the ways in which authorities
thought about (some) individuals as potential citizens, and the
ways in which they tried to act upon them.”303 They argue that
“specific biological presuppositions . . . have underlain many
citizenship projects,” and use the term “biological citizenship”
descriptively “to encompass all those citizenship projects that
have linked their conceptions of citizens to beliefs about the
biological existence of human beings, as individuals, as families
and lineages, as communities, as population and races, and as
a species.”304 Echoing the arguments of Heath, Rapp, and
Taussig, Rose and Novas assert that solidaristic ties formed
through biological commonalities allow groups to make certain
types of ethical demands—on themselves, on communities, and
on the state.305 These demands may come through the sort of
advocacy groups identified by Heath, Rapp, and Taussig;306 in
contrast to their conceptualization of genetic citizenship as a
basis for solidaristic organization and political engagement,
Rose and Novas foreground the consumerist attributes of
biological citizenship, presenting the human body as an object
to be targeted by enhancement technologies in a global market
that exists separate from nation-states.307 As they put it, “[t]his
is the citizenship of brand culture, where trust in brands
appears capable of supplanting trust in neutral scientific
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id.
Id. at 357.
Rose & Novas, supra note 293, at 439; see ROSE, supra note 293.
Rose & Novas, supra note 293, at 440.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 440–42.
Id. at 448.
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expertise.”308 Like Childerhose, Rose and Novas note that
biological citizenship also makes demands on subjects “to
inform him- or herself not only about current illness, but also
about susceptibilities and predispositions. . . . [and] to take
appropriate steps” to minimize the risk of illness and maximize
health.309 As consumers, biological citizens have duties, but
unlike those articulated by Emanuel et al., these duties
primarily involve their own self-fashioning rather than
participating in a common enterprise for the greater good.310
Some critics have expressed concerns that this vision of
citizenship, with its apparent celebration of citizenship as a
function of consumption, is a dangerous departure from more
traditional conceptions of social and political citizenship.311
Childerhose’s argument that the campaign for GINA
involved casting the entire nation as a genomic citizens jibes
with Shklar’s focus on citizenship as standing with its
concomitant demand for inclusion in the polity. Yet, as Steven
Epstein ably shows, inclusion in the life sciences can be
complex and contested, implicating politics that may
exacerbate inequalities even as it is trying to address them.312
Shklar’s idea of citizenship focused on the quest for civic
inclusion as full members of the polity. Epstein’s biopolitical
citizens, in contrast, seek inclusion primarily as subjects of
biomedical research.313 Inclusion also may be double edged
insofar as the grant of standing may also impose duties.314 The
duties elaborated by previous analyses of the diverse facets of
modern genetic or biological citizenship focus primarily on
issues of individual self-care, education, and consumption.
Ironically, even as these models involve genetic identities
forming the basis for new communal ties, they reproduce

308. Id.
309. Id. at 451.
310. Id.
311. Roger Cooter, Biocitizenship, 372 LANCET 1725, 1725 (2008) available
at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(08)617195/fulltext.
312. EPSTEIN, supra note 292, at 4 (“Since the mid-1980s, . . . reformers
ha[ve] argued that expert knowledge about human health is dangerously
flawed . . . because of inadequate representation of groups within research
populations in studies of a wide range of diseases.”).
313. Id. at 6 (describing his “inclusion-and-difference paradigm”).
314. Id. at 11.
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classically liberal conceptions of citizens as atomized individual
consumers—making demands for particular goods and services.
This last model of citizen as consumer actually has its
roots in Progressive Era America.315 As Schudson notes, this
period was marked by a shift to impersonal authority grounded
in the authority of science and law, where a good citizen was an
informed and rational one.316 Progressive reformers worked
diligently to recast citizenship as a function of consuming
information about government and then using their vote as a
means, in effect, to purchase the leaders and policies they
preferred.317 Central to this reconfiguration of citizenship was a
national campaign to create public budgets at all levels of
government.318 Difficult as it may be to conceive today, no
governmental entity in the United States had anything looking
like a modern budgetary system before the twentieth
century.319 Budget reformers of the Progressive Era conceived
of public budgets as presenting fundamental information about
the constitution of government to the people.320 They deemed
access to such information as critical to maintaining a viable
representative democracy in modern, urban, industrialized
society.321 This scheme effectively aimed to deracinate
citizenship by realigning its duties from old schemes of
deference to elites or tribal party affiliation toward the rational
and systematic consumption of information about the working
of the state as presented through well-publicized budgets.322
This involved quite literally putting the state on display.323
In 1908, New York City inaugurated the first of several grand
“Budget Exhibits,” something akin to the public fairs and
expositions that swept the country in the preceding decades but
focused on graphically representing the functions of local
government to the citizens.324 Over one million people attended
315. SCHUDSON, supra note 256, at 294–95.
316. Id.
317. JONATHAN KAHN, BUDGETING DEMOCRACY: STATE BUILDING AND
CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICA, 1890–1928, at 93–119 (1997).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 1 (“Before the twentieth century, no government in the United
States, local, state, or national, had a coherent budget system.”).
320. Id. at 1–2.
321. Id. at 2.
322. Id. at 1–6, 104–11, 120–64.
323. Id. at 104–11.
324. Id.
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the last and grandest of these annual exhibits, held during the
month of October, 1911.325 As budget reform went national
with the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
this function was taken over by the budget document itself,
which purported to present a detailed public accounting of
governmental priorities and allocation of resources.326 In some
respects, one may (somewhat anachronistically) consider the
budget to have been understood as an early political analogue
to DNA—information deemed fundamentally constitutive, not
of the body, but of the body politic.
Whereas the budget reformers of the early twentieth
century deemed consumption of budgetary information about
the state to be a preeminent mark of the “good” citizen,327
modern analysts of biotechnology, particularly Rose and Novas,
see consumption of genetic information about the self to be the
distinguishing feature of the “good” citizen in the early twentyfirst century.328 The former model of deracinated citizenship
aimed to strip personal identity from a civic life based on
science and expertise but was ultimately oriented toward the
state and a sense of common civic obligation to a larger public
good. The latter model layers new genetic identities on
citizenship, creating the basis for new types of communal
bonds, but it is ultimately oriented toward corporations and the
market as source of redress for their concerns.
In a sense, what has happened here is a shift from an early
twentieth-century model of the citizen as consumer to an early
twenty-first-century model of the consumer as citizen. Both,
perhaps,
are
grounded
in
Lawrence
Friedman’s
characterization of twentieth century America as a “Republic of
Friedman
contrasts
the
self-disciplined
Choice.”329
individualism of the nineteenth century with the selfexpressive individualism of the twentieth century in which “the
right to ‘be oneself,’ to choose oneself, is placed in a special and

325. Id.
326. Id. at 104–11, 120–64.
327. See supra notes 315–26 and accompanying text.
328. See Rose & Novas, supra note 293, at 441 (“[N]ow one must also know
and manage the implications of one’s own genome.”).
329. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW,
AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE (1990).
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privileged position.”330 The literal refashioning of the embodied
self-enabled by modern biotechnology marks perhaps the
apotheosis of this vision. The result is a kind of republican
consumerism, where one’s duty to the polity is exercised
through market virtues, not civic ones. Where earlier groups
based campaigns for voting rights or school desegregation on
civic standing and inclusion as a function of human dignity, the
inclusion sought by genetic citizens often involves demands for
access to biotechnological products.
VI. PRIVATIZING CITIZENSHIP
How then, do recent efforts at recruitment for large-scale
genomic population studies and Emanuel et al.’s call for an
obligation to participate in research fit into the traditions of
American citizenship? In analogizing the duty to participate in
biomedical research to the duty to vote, Emanuel et al. clearly
frame it as civic, a central attribute of good citizenship in the
communitarian or civic republican strains that emphasize
virtuous practice.331 The idea here is that participating in
biomedical research is a kind of public service.332 They are not
alone in this general approach, but it involves a critical shift
from a liberal, rights-focused conception of an active citizenry
of patient advocacy groups making demands of biomedical
researchers, to recruiters invoking a civic republican dutybased model of citizenship to make demands of potential
subjects. As Steven Epstein notes, early health activists
“invoked ideas of citizenship to demand that researchers attend
to the health research needs of disadvantaged groups,
investigators seeking to recruit subjects have counterposed
such citizenship rights with citizenship duties: the good citizen
is one who volunteers on behalf of his or her community.”333
Epstein focused on “community” largely as a term related to
330. Id. at 3. Friedman’s contrast echoes the categories elaborated by
Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, and William Sullivan. See ROBERT N. BELLAH
ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN
LIFE (1985). In particular, Habits of the Heart notes the rise of expressive
individualism in the twentieth century. See id. at 27–54, 142–66. Expressive
individualism is marked by a therapeutic ideal of individual self-realization.
See id.
331. See Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 70; supra note 257 and
accompanying text.
332. See Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 71.
333. EPSTEIN, supra note 292, at 190.
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fellow sufferers,334 much as did Heath, Rapp, and Taussig.335
Emanuel et al., however, move beyond the notion of a
community of fellow sufferers to extend the call of duty to all
citizens,336 more in line with Childerhose’s notion of a genomic
citizenship that embraces us all.337
Emanuel et al. also stand out in their explicit embrace of
the idea that service to the community is to be realized first
through service to the needs of private corporations.338 Unlike
voting, which ostensibly manifests a form of citizen control over
the state, participating in biomedical research introduces the
citizen-subject into a commercial nexus that extracts value
from her body while conferring no control whatsoever over the
ultimate disposition of the knowledge and products derived
therefrom.339 Emanuel et al. are aware of this problem and
address it by trying to elide the difference between private gain
and ultimate service to the final good of public health.340 To a
certain degree, this elision may be understood as a sort of civic
analogue to the therapeutic misconception. Where the classic
therapeutic misconception involves blurring the distinction
between research and therapy,341 its civic analogue—a civic
misconception, as it were—here blurs the distinction between
biomedical service to one’s community and commercial service
to a corporation. Demanding the right to participate in a trial
to promote the interests of your biomedical-identified political
community—as in the case of AIDS activists in the late 1970s
and early 1990s342—is one thing; positing a duty for all citizens
to participate may sound like a similar kind of call for
334. Id.
335. Heath et al., supra note 290, at 152–67; Taussig, Hoeyer & Helmreich,
supra note 17, at S10–S12.
336. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 68–70.
337. Childerhose, supra note 291, at 335.
338. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 71.
339. Cf. id. at 71 (“[I]t could be objected that patented biomedical
knowledge is not a public good, and hence participation in industry-sponsored
research that may produce patented knowledge is not an obligation.”).
340. Id. at 70–71.
341. Lidz & Appelbaum, supra note 210, at V57.
342. EPSTEIN, supra note 292, at 118–24. See generally STEVEN EPSTEIN,
IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996)
[hereinafter
EPSTEIN,
IMPURE
SCIENCE],
available
at
http://
publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft1s20045x;chunk.id=
0;doc.view=print (discussing the changing role of activism within the AIDS
movement).
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inclusion, but it is externally imposed and only indirectly
serves the public good through the vehicle of a corporate
intermediary which holds all substantive control over the
process and its products.
When dealing with a public good such as biomedical
knowledge, Emanuel et al. declare, “[w]ho provides the good is
irrelevant to whether it is public or private. A private company
might provide a public good like fireworks, whereas a
government could provide unemployment benefits, which is a
private good because it can be given to unemployed individuals
but not to others.”343 This, of course, overlooks the fact that
private companies do not provide fireworks for free, nor do
construction companies build roads and schools for free. They
do so pursuant to government contracts that specify the terms
and conditions of the service. Such is not the case with
pharmaceutical and medical device developers.344 Perhaps a
more apt analogy would be to the building of railroads across
the old West, which involved a massive transfer of public assets
(i.e., land) to private railroad companies.345 In the case of
biomedical research, however, the massive transfer of assets
does not involve exploiting land but the bodies of citizens.
Perhaps most striking is the contrast between Emanuel et
al.’s model and the civic ideals promulgated from the
Progressive Era ideal up through modern notions of genetic or
biological citizenship. These earlier models cast the citizen as a
consumer whose primary duty was to take in information
(whether about the state or about their own biological
condition) and act on it in a reasoned and responsible
manner.346 In characterizing participation as a duty of
citizenship, Emanuel et al. recast the good citizen from being a
consumer to being herself an object of consumption.347 The
early twentieth-century model citizen was encouraged to
consume political information about the state; the early
343. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 68.
344. Bernard H. Munos & William W. Chin, How to Revive Breakthrough
Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., June
29, 2011, at 2–3.
345. RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 24–25 (2011) (explaining that the land granted
to railroads east and west of the Mississippi, if concentrated into a single
state, would be the third-largest state in America).
346. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 69–71.
347. Id. at 71.
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twenty-first century genetic or biomedical citizen was
encouraged to consume biological information about him- or
herself; and Emanuel et al.’s ideal citizen herself becomes a
source of information that is consumed by corporate drug
developers. The citizen moves from being a consumer to being
the consumed.
This latest model of citizenship is complementary to that of
Rose and Novas. The biomedical products that Rose and
Novas’s good biocitizen is duty-bound to consume are produced
through the participation of Emanuel et al.’s good citizen in
biomedical research. Each model, however, implicates
privatization and power differently. Rose and Novas’s model
privatizes citizenship simply insofar as the good biocitizen
exercises her primary duties—of informed self-care and
consumption of biomedical interventions—in the private realm
of the marketplace.348 The model elaborated by Emanuel et al.,
and in related endeavors such as the GPPC town halls,
privatizes citizenship more profoundly by conscripting the core
values and meaning of citizenship into the service of private
corporate entities, thereby commodifying citizenship as a
resource to be exploited for commercial product development.349
Consider further how the original politics of budgets and of
biomedicine were both built on display: the one putting the
state on display through exhibits that employed such cutting
edge technology as film (to show, for example, the fire
department putting out a fire);350 the other putting the body on
display through such similarly cutting edge technologies as gel
electrophoresis, magnetic resonance imaging, and electron
microscopes.351 In the early twentieth century the state was to
be put on display to the citizens as a basis for reasoned political
action; in the early twenty-first century one’s body was to be
put on display to oneself as a basis for reasoned self-care. In
Emanuel et al.’s model, however, one’s body is to be put on
display to biomedical researchers as a basis for product
development.352

348. See Rose & Novas, supra note 293, at 441–42, 458–59.
349. See supra Part III.
350. EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE, supra note 342, at 325 (discussing the
impact of a film and the public’s perception of issues it presented).
351. DEP’T OF ENERGY & NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 30, at 16.
352. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 68.
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Nonetheless, Emanuel et al. assert that because “the
enterprise of biomedical research” produces the public good of
medical knowledge, which benefits all, it creates an obligation
for all to support it.353 They readily acknowledge that the great
majority of such research is sponsored by pharmaceutical
corporations, but argue that since a private company can
provide a public good, “there can be obligations to help private
companies produce public goods.”354 Keith Faulks notes that
the obligations of citizenship “may be seen as . . . an expression
of solidarity and empathy with others.”355 Certainly this is the
feeling Emanuel et al. wish to invoke. But under their model
citizen research subjects express their sympathy and solidarity
elsewhere—with private companies.356 The fact that such
private companies may patent the public good of biomedical
knowledge produced by broad citizen participation does not
trouble them because patents eventually expire and in any
event, the knowledge underlying the patent remains public.357
This model also imposes duty asymmetrically. Here the
good citizen has an obligation to contribute to the production of
the public good of biomedical knowledge by serving as a human
subject for research.358 The corporation, however, has no
corresponding duty whatsoever. Rather, it is merely assumed
that the logic of the market will impel the corporation to
develop that knowledge rapidly and efficiently into an effective
product that improves human health.359 The corporation may
patent the knowledge, charge fees for the product that place it
out beyond the reach of many of the same human subjects who
provided the information critical to its development, strike
deals with potential generic manufacturers (if the product is a
drug) to stave off early introduction of lower priced
alternatives, lobby for and exploit tax preferences for research
and development, withhold information from the public about
negative results, skew clinical trial designs to favor their

353. Id. at 68.
354. Id. at 71.
355. KEITH FAULKS, CITIZENSHIP 82 (2000).
356. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 71.
357. Id.
358. Caplan, supra note 222, at 4.
359. Id. at 2 (discussing how the first step to the production of new drugs is
the participation of citizens thus inferring that a reliance exists but not a duty
to produce new drugs).
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products, conduct misleading marketing campaigns, and so
forth360—all without offending any duty to serve the public
good. The model thoroughly decontextualizes the production of
biomedical knowledge, stripping it of any connection to the
actual conditions under which corporations conduct research,
development, and marketing.
This is more than the sort of “enclosure” of the human
genome through patenting examined by critics such as James
Boyle361 and recently litigated in the case of Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics.362 It is the
appropriation of the embodied citizenry—a privatization of
citizenship itself. Emanuel et al.’s ideal citizen owes a duty not
to the state but to private corporations, which, they assume
will go on to provide public goods.363 The conditions under
which such goods are provided are irrelevant for them. In
contrast to the model of activist groups, such as the Genetic
Alliance, who use genetic identities to enlist individuals into
groups that can make claims on the state (or on
corporations),364 Emanuel et al. use biological identity (as
broadly conceived by Rose and Novas) to make claims on the
individual. Where basic duties of self-care and education still
involve a sense of duty to the civic community—particularly to
fellow-sufferers—the duty to participate in corporate research
is owed primarily and directly to the private corporation.365
Such a duty may be conceived of as civic only to the extent that
it is mediated through the presumed ability of the corporation
to serve the larger public good.366 Here the locus of engagement

360. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 109–
12 (2004) (discussing the Remone research paper controversy, in which public
researchers were sued when the private drug manufacturer disliked their
negative findings); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS,
RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 401–17 (2004); MELODY
PETERSON, OUR DAILY MEDS 123–29 (2008).
361. JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF
THE MIND 42–54 (2008).
362. Adam Liptak, Justices, 9-0, Bar Patenting Human Genes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/14/us/supreme-court-ruleshuman-genes-may-not-be-patented.html; see Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
363. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 71 (“[T]here can be obligations to
help private companies produce public goods.”).
364. Genetic Discrimination, supra note 156.
365. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 71.
366. See Caplan, supra note 222, at 2.
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where a citizen discharges her duty is not the public sphere of
civic space, it is the private clinical research trial.367 The citizen
does not engage with other citizens, articulate, or make
demands; rather the citizen is himself articulated, rendered
transparent, open, and susceptible to exploitation—in the name
of science but in the service of the corporate enterprise.368
Finally, to the extent that the very concept of citizenship itself
is a public resource, capable of mobilizing and directing loyalty,
allegiance, and related civic virtues, this call to serve
biomedical research transfers the authority of the state to
make claims based on citizenship into the hands of private
enterprise.369
From the GPPC’s town halls to Emanuel et al.’s focus on
duty, these initiatives are developing a model of biomedical
citizenship that is characterized by market negotiation (as in
the GPPC focus group research), consumerist practices (as
observed by Rose and Novas), and product development (the
ultimate goal of Emanuel et al.’s call to participate in research).
To the extent that rights (such as access to information or
return of research results) matter at all, they are only those
rights that individuals are able to bargain for through the sort
of market-mediated quid pro quo presented in the GPPC
discussion groups. This model privatizes biomedical citizenship
as a function of market relations by appropriating civic
republican traditions of the practices of good citizenship to
enlist the populace to serve private corporate interests while
obscuring or marginalizing the liberal tradition’s focus on the
individual rights of citizenship conferred by virtue of one’s basic
status as a member of the political community.
VII.

CALL OF DUTY: THE MILLION VETERAN
PROGRAM

The story here takes a brief detour to the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), where a parallel large population study

367. See id. at 5.
368. See Rhodes, supra note 230, at 21–22 (discussing the exploitation of
subjects in Nazi experiments and the lack of consideration of the substantial
risks, all for the benefit of society or in this case, the society that the Nazis
deemed important).
369. Contra Herrera, supra note 228, at 225 (asserting that authority will
be given back to the citizen and they will be able to decide their participation
if they have been chosen from the suggested lottery system).
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initiative emerged invoking similar but distinctly military
tropes of duty and service to recruit participants.370 Since our
founding, the citizen-soldier has been a central figure in
constructing ideals of America citizenship.371 During the
American Revolution the symbol of the Roman patrician
Cincinnatus, who left his plow to take up arms and then
returned to civilian life, became a model of civic virtue for the
citizen-soldiers fighting for the new republic.372 America’s
oldest patriotic organization, the Society of the Cincinnati, was
founded in 1783 to honor this ideal.373
In 2007, while it was working in conjunction with the NIH
to develop its scheme of town halls and surveys to assess
attitudes among the general public toward participating in
genetic research, the GPPC also received nearly half a million
dollars to assess the attitudes toward genetic research and
genomic medicine of veterans who receive their health care
through the VA.374 This project was deliberately conceived as a
companion to the GPPCs work for the NIH.375 As the GPPC
noted at the time, working with the VA presented a distinct
opportunity because it is one of the largest health care systems
in the United States, providing care to over 5.3 million patients
with an integrated electronic medical record system.376 The
GPPC conducted a survey of 931 veterans enrolled in the VA
health system about attitudes toward participating in a VAbased biobank to conduct research on issues of distinct interest

370. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, MORAL
SCIENCE: PROTECTING PARTICIPANTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH 37
(2011), available at http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Moral%20Science%
20-%20Final.pdf (supporting the concept of research with human subjects).
371. See, e.g., R. CLAIRE SNYDER, CITIZEN-SOLDIERS AND MANLY
WARRIORS: MILITARY SERVICE AND GENDER IN THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION 80 (1999) (“The early American allegiance to the ideals of civic
republicanism included a commitment to the ideal of the Citizen-Solider.”).
372. N.S. Gill, Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus, ABOUT.COM ANCIENT /
CLASSICAL HISTORY, http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/rulersleaderskings/p/
Cincinnatus.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2014).
373. Ross G. Perry, President General’s Welcome, SOC’Y CINCINNATI,
http://societyofthecincinnati.org/about (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
374. Press Release, Johns Hopkins Univ. Genetics & Pub. Policy Ctr.,
Center Conducts Public Consultation Project for VA (June 20, 2007), available
at http://www.dnapolicy.org/news.release.php?action=detail&pressrelease_id=
80.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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to veterans, such as possible genetic factors affecting posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).377 A large majority of
respondents supported the idea of creating such a database,
with seventy-one percent indicating they would definitely or
probably participate.378
With these results in hand, the VA launched the Million
Veteran Program (MVP) in 2011.379 As described by the VA:
MVP is a national, voluntary research program funded entirely by
the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Research &
Development. The goal of MVP is to partner with Veterans
receiving their care in the VA Healthcare System to study how
genes affect health. To do this, MVP will build one of the world’s
largest medical databases by safely collecting blood samples and
health information from one million Veteran volunteers. Data
collected from MVP will be stored anonymously for research on
diseases like diabetes and cancer, and military-related illnesses,
such as post-traumatic stress disorder.380

On November 11, 2013, the VA announced it had enrolled its
200,000th participant in the program, making it the largest
research program ever conducted by the VA.381 It hopes to
reach its goal of one million enrolled veterans by 2017.382
Reporting and promotional materials on the MVP
repeatedly invoke tropes of service, comradeship, and duty.383
Given the military context, such framings seem to have been
far more readily accepted and generally less contested than
Emanuel et al.’s similar call to duty in a civilian context.384 The
377. Jane Sherwin, New VA Program Could Pave the Way for Personalized
Care, AAMC REPORTER (July 2011), https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/
reporter/july11/254618/veterans.html; see Carolyn Johnson, Veterans Taking
Part in Massive DNA Project, KGO-TV (Jan. 4, 2012), http://abclocal.go.com/
kgo/story?section=news/health&id=8490606.
378. Sherwin, supra note 377.
379. Id.
380. Million Veteran Program, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF. (last updated
Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.research.va.gov/mvp/default.cfm.
381. Turna Ray, With Enrollment at 200K, VA’s Million Veteran Program
Inks Contracts for Genetic Analysis, PHARMACOGENOMICS REP. (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.genomeweb.com/clinical-genomics/enrollment-200k-vas-millionveteran-program-inks-contracts-genetic-analysis.
382. Id.
383. Jay Price, Veterans Give Even More; 1 Million Sought for DNA Data,
NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/
02/08/1837995/veterans-give-even-more.html.
384. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, The Million Veteran
Program: VA’s Genomics Game-Changer Launches Nationwide (May 5, 2011)
[hereinafter Genomics Game-Changer], available at http://www.va.gov/opa/
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VA describes the MVP as a “partnership with veterans”385 that
is well-positioned to succeed “thanks to its large, diverse, and
altruistic patient population.”386 Similarly, Dr. Joel
Kupersmith, the VA’s chief research and development officer
expressed confidence about subject recruitment because “vets
are very altruistic people and they’re likely to help if you tell
them it will benefit someone else.”387
News reports of the MVP have repeatedly cited veterans’
own invocations of service and duty as underlying their
decision to participate.388 “It’s just one more way to serve my
country,” said Army veteran Clarence Gray.389 Becky
Carpenter, a third generation veteran, framed her participation
as growing out of her “strong history of service,” casting the
MVP as another opportunity for veterans “to serve our
country.”390 Marine Corps veteran Andrew Peters, enrolling in
California, framed participation as a duty to the service, to
medicine and to each other.391 The sense of duty to each other
also invokes ideals of military fraternity echoed by JD LeBlanc,
a Vietnam veteran who said he enrolled because “[a]nything I
can do to help future vets is worthwhile.”392 Similarly, Robert
Stephens, assistant Army chaplain in the Vietnam War
asserted that “[w]e have to help each other.”393 Throughout,
powerful tropes of duty and service—specifically military
attributes of good citizenship—frame the efforts to recruit
veterans into a massive genomic research project. Though
running on a parallel course to the NIH efforts to develop an
pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=2090 (discussing a willingness to help other
veterans with the “care they have earned”).
385. Million Veteran Program, supra note 380.
386. Genomics Game-Changer, supra note 384.
387. Meredith Cohn, Project Seeks 1 Million Veterans to Give Blood, DNA
for Disease Research Department of Veterans Affairs Working to Uncover
SUN
(Feb.
5,
2012),
http://
Genetic
Mysteries,
BALTIMORE
www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-hs-million-veteran-program-20120204,0,
1502812.story (internal quotation marks omitted).
388. Id.; Price, supra note 383.
389. Price, supra note 383.
390. Kristen Moulton, Salt Lake Veterans Affairs Enlists Vets for Huge
Medical Research Project, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 26, 2012, 7:35 PM),
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/53381550-78/veterans-program-veteranmillion.html.csp.
391. Johnson, supra note 377.
392. Moulton, supra note 390.
393. Id.
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LPS, the MVP similarly invoked, perhaps even more explicitly,
ideals of duty and service as a tool of recruitment.
VIII.

THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT: REVISING THE
COMMON RULE

Coming back to the civilian sector: to this point we have
had Francis Collins calling for a large cohort population study
to follow on the heels of the completion of the HGP;394 the NIH
enlisting the GPPC to conduct preliminary studies exploring
how best to recruit people to such a study;395 and Emanuel et
al. positing a moral obligation to participate in order to get
willing recruits in the door.396 The next essential piece to
proceeding with research is to obtain the subjects’ consent. At
the federal level, questions of consent in human subject
research are most fully dealt with under a series of regulations
first issued in 1991 that have come to be known as the
“Common Rule,” codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46.397
The Common Rule governs eighteen federal departments
and agencies (most prominently the Department of Health and
Human Services) and applies as well to all research funded by
the agencies.398 The Rule generally requires informed consent,
independent ethical review by Institutional Review Boards
(IRBs), and the minimization of avoidable risks.399 The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), while not formally covered by
the Common Rule, applies essentially the same standards to all
research supporting submissions for regulatory approval.400
The concerns for human subjects protections embodied in
the Common Rule have their roots in the Nuremberg Code,
promulgated in the aftermath of World War II, and revelations
of Nazi abuses of prisoners for research.401 At the core of the
394. See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
396. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 67.
397. 45 CFR 46—FAQs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://answers.hhs.gov/ohrp/categories/1562 (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. For a chart of the differences between FDA regulations and the
Common Rule, see Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject Protection
Regulations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/
SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/educationalmaterials/ucm112910.htm
(last updated Mar. 10, 2009).
401. Rhodes, supra note 230, at 21–22.
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Code is a concern for informed consent and a balancing of risks
and benefits to protect the human subject.402 In 1964 the World
Health Association adopted additional “Recommendations
Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving
Human Subjects” in its Declaration of Helsinki.403 The
Declaration has been revised many times since. Like the
Nuremberg Code, it is also concerned with consent and also
extensively discusses the management of risk to the human
subject.404 In particular, its most current iteration specifies
that research “must be preceded by careful assessment of
predictable risks and burdens to the individuals and
communities involved in the research in comparison with
foreseeable benefits to them and to other individuals or
communities affected by the condition under investigation;”405
that “[p]hysicians may not participate in a research study
involving human subjects unless they are confident that the
risks involved have been adequately assessed and can be
satisfactorily managed;”406 and that “[m]edical research
involving human subjects may only be conducted if the
importance of the objective outweighs the inherent risks and
burdens to the research subjects.”407
Revelations of research abuses such as the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study in the early 1970s led to the passage in 1974 of
the National Research Act,408 which created the Commission
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research.409 Four years later the Commission
published Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Research, known as the Belmont Report,
which became a foundational document for contemporary

402. See The Nuremberg Code, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2014).
403. See WMA Declaration of Helsinki – Ethical Principles for Medical
MED.
ASS’N,
Research
Involving
Human
Subjects,
WORLD
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.pdf (last visited Jan.
28, 2014).
404. Id. at 3–5.
405. Id. at 3.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee: Research
Implications,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2013).
409. See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
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bioethics in the United States.410 Using the Belmont Report as
a guide, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
began to revise and expand its regulations governing human
subjects research.411 This work evolved into the uniform set of
regulations adopted as the Common Rule in 1991.412
In July 2011, less than two years after Emanuel et al.
published their call for a civic obligation to participate in
biomedical research, HHS published an advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning possible revisions to
the Common Rule.413 The announcement noted that “[t]he
current regulations governing human subjects research were
developed years ago when research was predominantly
conducted at universities, colleges, and medical institutions,
and each study generally took place at only a single site.”414
Expansion of human subject research into many new scientific
disciplines and venues and an increase in multi-site studies
have highlighted ambiguities in the current rules and have led
to questions about whether the current regulatory framework
is effectively keeping up with the needs of researchers and
research subjects.415 Consent and IRB review are at the center
of this problem.416 Most consent protocols commonly limit the
use of information or biospecimens to the particular study or
institution where the information is gathered.417 This makes
open-ended research of the kind called for in a large population
study exceedingly difficult. As for IRBs, Coleman et al. note
that the “goal for IRBs is not to eliminate the risks of research,
but to ensure that the risks have been minimized to the extent
reasonably possible and that any remaining risks are justified
by the benefits the study is likely to achieve.”418 Yet, as
biomedical research has become increasingly complex and

410. See Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979).
411. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,512–31 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
412. See 45 CFR 46—FAQs, supra note 397.
413. Human Subjects Research Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,512.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 44,518.
417. Id. at 44,519.
418. CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH
WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 245 (2005).
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geographically dispersed, many researchers have come to see
IRB review as excessively burdensome and time-consuming.419
The ANPRM identified seven key concerns animating the
call for revisions, focusing broadly on issues relating to risk,
efficiency, and consent.420 Its “fundamental goal” was “to
enhance the effectiveness of the research oversight system by
improving the protections for human subjects while also
reducing burdens, delays, and ambiguity for investigators and
research subjects.”421 While unremarkable in itself, this
framing creates a direct relationship and possible tension
between providing adequate protections for human subjects
and increasing the efficiency of the process. Implicitly,
requirements that protect subjects are cast as presenting
potential barriers to research and development. While much of
the ANPRM involves consideration of reducing regulatory
burdens placed on relatively low-risk social science research,422
a central component of the proposed revisions focuses on
expanding existing exemptions from full IRB review (to be
recast under the heading of “excused” rather than “exempt”
research) to cover research on biospecimens, provided certain
new consent requirements are satisfied.423
Biospecimens provide the foundation for the sort of largescale, longitudinal population study called for by Francis
Collins and presented by the GPPC for consideration in its
town halls and focus groups.424 They comprise the biobanks
that provide access to the genetic information that many
researchers hope may be correlated with ongoing phenotypic
traits and etiology of particular health conditions over time.425
Currently, using such information in a research study is
generally exempt from the burdens of IRB review if the
information has been “de-identified”—that is, if it cannot be

419. Human Subjects Research Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,512–31,
44,518 (portraying the process as burdensome and asking how to streamline
it).
420. Id. at 44,513.
421. Id. at 44,514.
422. E.g., id. at 44,516 (providing for “expedited review” for minimal risk
studies, “particularly those in the social and behavioral field”).
423. Id. at 44,515.
424. Kaufman et al., supra note 147, at 831.
425. Id. at 831–32.
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traced back to an individual source.426 The sort of large-scale
population studies proposed by Collins and the GPPC, however,
are much more useful if the information can be connected to
the type of specific phenotypic information that would render
the biospecimens “identifiable.”427
The ANPRM addressed this problem by proposing to allow
open and free use of biospecimens for research from subjects
who first signed a “brief standard consent form agreeing to
generally permit future research.”428 All future studies using
such biospecimens, whether for clinical purposes or not, would
fall under the new “excused” category and hence “not require
IRB review or any routine administrative review but would be
subject to the data security and information protection
standards” proposed elsewhere in the ANPRM.429 The purpose
here is to “calibrate[ ]” the levels of review “to [the] . . . degree
of risk” involved in the research;430 the idea being that review
itself presents a burden or barrier to the conduct of research
that needs to be minimized to a degree commensurate with the
level of risk it is intended to manage. As a result, the previous
“limitation that the researcher cannot record and retain
information that identifies the subjects would be eliminated.”431
The ANPRM casts the risks of biospecimen research as
primarily informational in nature, involving, for example, the
unintended release of private information or the public
identification of basic genetic information with a particular
individual.432 It proposes a new regime for data security to
manage such information and therefore argues that “only
noninformational risks would be considered in determining the
level of risk posed by research studies.”433 Here, the ANPRM
neatly casts the risks of biospecimen collection as a matter of
data management rather than involving ethical questions
relating to the status of or possible harms to participants.434 It
426. See Human Subjects Research Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,527
(noting that de-identified information does not require written consent for
future research or IRB review).
427. Id. at 44,524–26.
428. Id. at 44,515.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 44,519.
432. Id. at 44,515–16.
433. Id. at 44,516.
434. See id.
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proposes adherence to standards for data security and
confidentiality modeled on those for health information in the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA).435 The ANPRM would thus transfer risk management
for biospecimens from IRB review to a technical realm largely
devoid of ethical considerations, with little oversight or
accountability.436
By reconfiguring risk, and hence removing IRB review
from the realm of biospecimen collection, the ANPRM leaves
consent as the only major regulatory hurdle to be crossed in
constructing a biobank for an LPS.437 There are two basic
components to the consent process: one must, of course, get
potential subjects actually to consent to participate in the
research; this consent additionally must be “informed.”438 In
this regard, the ANPRM’s proposal to allow general open-ended
consent for all potential future use of identifiable information is
both very powerful and highly problematic.
As it turns out, Ezekiel Emanuel was part of the working
group convened by the Office of Management and Budget to
consider revisions to the Common Rule that came to be
published in the ANPRM.439 In 2011, while still at the NIH,
Emanuel co-authored an article with Jerry Menikoff discussing
the ANPRM and the rationale for it.440 Published in the New
England Journal of Medicine, the article largely summarizes
the main points of the ANPRM.441 It begins by noting that the
Common Rule has persisted largely unchanged since it was
first introduced in 1991, while research practices had developed
dramatically in both size and scope since that time, giving rise
to much criticism of the current regulatory regime.442 Emanuel
and Menikoff identify two key themes in these critiques: first,
“the regulations impose a variety of burdensome bureaucratic
procedures that seem to do little to protect research

435. Id. at 44,514.
436. Id.
437. See id. at 44,522.
438. See id. at 44,517.
439. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jerry Menikoff, Reforming the Regulations
Governing Research with Human Subjects, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1145, 1145
(2011).
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id.
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participants, yet consume substantial resources;” and second,
“current regulations could be doing a significantly better job in
protecting research subjects.”443 They cast regulatory burden
and risk to human subjects as the two primary barriers to the
progress of research.444 With respect to biospecimens, the
proposed revisions deal with the first barrier by removing this
category of research from IRB review, and with the second by
redefining risk as primarily informational and hence
manageable through technical means that, again, involve
minimal ethical oversight.445
Further expressing concern over the need to revise
regulation governing the use of biospecimens, Emanuel and
Menikoff note that “[m]any commentators have argued that
uncertainty about the regulations on biospecimens has
impeded research. Yet research with biospecimens is becoming
increasingly important;”446 they state this despite their
assertion that “such research often entails no or minimal
physical risk.”447 Having established a frame that juxtaposes
excessive regulatory burden against minimal risk, they move
on to make a case for the ANPRM’s suggestions that:
[A] standard, brief, and general form be used to obtain consent for
the future open-ended use of biospecimens in research. Further,
such a form need not be signed each and every time a specimen is
collected. Rather, researchers or hospitals might ask participants
to sign one form in which they agree to such future use of all
specimens (existing or to be collected in the future).448

Significantly, these arguments appear under the heading
“Enhancing Protections for Research Participants.”449 Such
revisions, however, are clearly calibrated more to reduce the
burden on researchers than to substantively enhance
protections for research subjects. Hence Emanuel and Menikoff
do not justify the proposal for open-ended consent by discussing
the benefits it might provide to participants, but by asserting
that such revisions will help to realize “the huge benefits to be
gained from such research.”450 The Nuremberg Code, the
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1148–49.
Id. at 1149.
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Helsinki Declaration, and the Belmont Report embraced
consent as a foundational recognition of the agency and dignity
of human subjects.451 While clearly still adhering to that view
in cases of clinical research, Emanuel and Menikoff here cast
consent, like risk, primarily as a burden to be managed in order
to realize the research potential of biospecimens.
In many respects, this view follows logically upon Emanuel
et al.’s call for a duty to participate in human subjects research.
Both are oriented toward promoting the basic conditions
necessary to develop large-scale genetically-based population
studies. The call of duty serves to bring people in the door; the
exemption from IRB review facilitates the development and
implementation of research protocols; and the relaxed consent
process eases the final step of actually enrolling people in the
study while opening up their data for free and unrestricted use
in the future.
Following the publication of the ANPRM, HHS collected
comments from the public responding to its proposals.452 A
majority of the more than eleven hundred comments received
favored the provision allowing for a general consent form to
permit future use of biospecimens and related data, clearly
recognizing the burden this would lift from their research
endeavors.453 Some comments, however, expressed grave
reservations, particularly with respect to issues of consent.454
The American Association of Medical Colleges (AAMC), for
example, asserted that,
An individual who is asked to sign a blanket consent document
without any information about what type of research might be
done in the future and with no opportunity to ask questions about
the research that may be conducted (for example, if such consent is
obtained just prior to surgery or on admission to a hospital) cannot
be said to have provided meaningful informed consent. This could
be more accurately characterized as “notice cloaked in consent’s
clothing,” providing individuals with a false sense of individual
control when, in fact, there is none.455

451. See supra notes 402–03, 410, and accompanying text.
452. See EDWARD BARTLETT, OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN
RESEARCH PROTS. (SACHRP), ANPRM: SUMMARY OF COMMENTS (2012),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/mtgings/2012%20Feb%20Mtg/
anprmsummaryebartlett.pdf.
453. Id. at 2.
454. Id. at 10.
455. Id.
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In contrast to viewing consent as a burden to be managed, the
AAMC emphasized the role of consent as recognition of
individual autonomy.456 It argued that completely open consent
to all possible future use cannot be truly informed insofar as a
subject cannot know to what purposes her biospecimens may
ultimately be put.457
Similarly, the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human
Research Protections (SACHRP) (created in 2001 and tasked
with providing expert advice and recommendations to the
Secretary of HSS on issues and topics pertaining to the
protection of human research subjects)458 pushed back against
some of the ANPRM’s suggestions regarding consent.459 It
noted that the consent process had indeed become cumbersome,
but attributed this less to the need to manage risk to subjects
than to concerns “about minimizing the potential risk of
adverse legal actions.”460 Here the SACHRP introduced a new
type of risk into the review of the consent process. In contrast
to the classic bioethical concerns to mitigate risk of personal
harm, the SACHRP here recognized that risks of legal action
introduced their own, distinctive burdens to the research
process.461 A consent regime based on mitigating risks of
personal harm to subjects may focus on issues of autonomy and
informed consent in one way; but a consent regime shaped by
concerns to mitigate risks of legal harm to researchers and
their sponsors may give rise to very different sorts of
approaches to consent. Certainly, the sort of brief, standardized
open-consent form for biospecimens research proposed by the
ANPRM was well tailored to mitigating legal risk.
The SACHRP, however, expressed concern that the
ANPRM focused “too much on the consent form as opposed to
the consent process.”462 This concern comports well with the
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections
(SACHRP), DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/
(last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
459. See Letter from Barbara E. Bierer, Chair, Sec’ys Advisory Comm. on
Human Research Prots., to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs. [hereinafter SACHRP Letter], available at http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/sachrp/commsec/sachrpanprmcommentsfinal.pdf.pdf.
460. Id. at 14.
461. Id. at 14–15.
462. Id. at 14.
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findings of a group of researchers from the University of North
Carolina who studied the attitudes of research subjects toward
participating in a genomic biobank.463 In their 2010 paper, the
researchers report that “whereas medical practice treats
[consent] as an event, our subjects talk about it as a discursive
process—that is, a process that unfolds over the course of
multiple communicative interactions.”464 They found that while
medical researchers focus on the actual act of signing a consent
form, this means relatively little to subjects, who may give
their consent for a wide range of reasons and may continue to
be interested in ongoing issues of consent long after the basic
form has been signed.465
The SACHRP identified six core elements of a good consent
process: “(1) statement that the project involves research; (2)
purpose; (3) ‘voluntary statement’ (including withdrawal); (4)
duration of participation; (5) risks related to the research itself;
(6) potential benefits of the research to subjects and society.”466
Under the Common Rule, consent is inextricably bound up with
weighing risks and benefits; but as the SACHRP makes clear,
risks are to be balanced against “potential” benefits.467 Each
enables the other: risks must be managed to realize potential;
potential must be substantial to outweigh risk. The balance is
not a direct calculus; rather it is part of informing a subject and
hence shaping her decision. One might well ask why potential
benefit should be made part of the subject’s calculus at all.
Making potential benefits a part of the consent process
implicitly makes demands upon the subject, informing her not
only of the dimensions of her altruism but also presenting a
picture of what may be lost if she does not participate.
The SACHRP went on to express concerns regarding the
ANPRM’s proposed general open consent model for
biospecimen research, stating that it
believes that a general consent for future use should not be a
necessary predicate for any and all future research uses, and that
such a general consent cannot act as a substitute for careful
463. John M. Conley et al., The Discourse of DNA: What Research Subjects
Say About Participating (or Not) in a Genomic Biobank (UNC Legal Studies
Research, Working Paper No. 1554744), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554744.
464. Id. at 4.
465. Id. at 11–12.
466. SACHRP Letter, supra note 459, at 15.
467. Id.

2014]

PRIVATIZING BIOMEDICAL CITIZENSHIP

863

consideration by an IRB, through the existing waiver of consent
process, of specific future research uses and their risks for
subjects.468

While perhaps placing unwarranted faith in the efficacy and
rigor of IRB review, the SACHRP nonetheless understood that
procedurally it was important to keep some formal mechanism
or institution in the ongoing oversight of biomedical research—
even when risks were low and potential benefits high.469 It
went on to observe that many industry-sponsored clinical trials
already offered a form of tiered consent that presented an array
of possible future uses to which participants could opt-in.470 It
further noted that foregoing general open consent would not
preclude future unanticipated uses of biospecimens “because,
presently, researchers have the option of seeking from an IRB a
waiver of informed consent for the future use.”471 The core of its
objection to general consent, however, echoed the AAMC
assertion about the inherent impossibility of providing truly
informed general consent to all future uses.472 Participants, the
Committee declared,
cannot accurately and fully be apprised of future benefits, or of
risks, or even of the research methods that might be employed, to
an extent that would allow a researcher to “skip the step” in future
specific studies of seeking either IRB waiver of consent, or subject
re-consent, under the Common Rule.473

Lest we consider the SACHRP as erecting excessive
barriers to future research on biospecimens, it is important to
realize that it was not advocating that control over such
research be located directly with the research participants.474
Rather, it argued for continuing under a regime that would
allow experts on IRBs to make decisions about waiving consent
for possible future uses.475 That is, it was arguing for keeping
IRBs in the loop—not necessarily the participants
468. Id. at 31.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 32.
473. Id. A 2012 feature article in the journal Nature noted that “[t]he
research coordinators who develop consent forms cannot predict how such
data might be used in the future, nor can they guarantee that the data will
remain protected.” Erika Check Hayden, A Broken Contract, 486 NATURE 312,
312 (2012).
474. See SACHRP Letter, supra note 459, at 33.
475. Id.
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themselves.476 It makes this case clearly in raising the problem
of free riding in a manner quite reminiscent of Emanuel et al.’s
call for a duty to participate:
It seems . . . contrary to the principles of beneficence and justice as
put forth in the Belmont Report to advocate a state of affairs in
which persons may refuse use of their own data and biospecimens,
even when risk to them is negligible, but who nevertheless
themselves benefit from such research by depending upon the
beneficence of others. Further, one cannot then ensure that the
results of any such research will be representative and not biased
or skewed.477

The SACHRP concluded that, counterintuitively, general
consent might therefore actually impede the ability of
investigators to use biospecimens for future research because of
the ability of participants to opt out under general consent.478
Moreover, it framed the ethical, legal and social policy
implications of consent regimes as involving primarily tensions
“between the needs of science and the rights of individuals.”479
This characterization of the issue rather conveniently
elides the role that commercial enterprises play in research and
development based on biospecimens. This is particularly
striking given the fact that the ANPRM itself mentioned the
case of Henrietta Lacks, whose cells, taken without her
knowledge or consent, provided the basis for billions of dollars’
worth of medical research and products.480 Moreover, the
earlier GPPC town hall meetings had found widespread
concern “that pharmaceutical or other companies might profit
off of the taxpayer-funded proposed study.”481 One participant,
for example, was worried that “[t]hey may produce drugs that
are so expensive that most people couldn’t afford them.”482 For
the SACHRP, however, such concerns did not play a part in
476. Id.
477. Id. at 36.
478. Id. at 35.
479. SEC’YS ADVISORY COMM. ON HUMAN RESEARCH PROTS., FAQS, TERMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT AND RESEARCH USE OF
BIOSPECIMENS 1 (2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/sachrp/
commsec/attachmentdfaq’stermsandrecommendations.pdf.pdf.
480. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,524 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56). For a discussion of the story of Henrietta Lacks, see
generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010).
481. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 8.
482. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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structuring the relationship between participant and
researcher—that was cast solely in terms of realizing the
potential of scientific progress—to which it cast individual
rights as a barrier. To the extent commercial considerations
entered the discussion, it was only in reference to having
investigators make disclosures of their own financial interests
in any research, not with reference to possible patenting of
material or other commercial issues related to equity or
distributional justice.483
In December 2011, just months after the publication of the
ANPRM, the Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues issued a report titled, MORAL SCIENCE:
Protecting Participants in Human Subjects Research.484 While
the President’s charge to the Commission came largely in
response to revelations by historian Susan Reverby concerning
U.S. involvement in serious research abuses in Guatemala in
the late 1940s (including the deliberate infection of vulnerable
and uninformed subjects with venereal diseases),485 the
Commission nonetheless was tasked to conduct “a thorough
review of current regulations and international standards to
assess whether they adequately protect human subjects in
federally supported scientific studies.”486 The Bioethics
Commission directly considered the ANPRM proposals to revise
the IRB review and consent process.487 In contrast to the
SACHRP, the Commission expressed few reservations.488 It
formally endorsed numerous of the ANPRM’s proposals,
including the elimination of “continuing review for certain
lower-risk studies and regularly update the list of research
categories that may undergo expedited review;” and providing
“standardized consent form templates with clear language
483. See SACHRP Letter, supra note 459, at 39 (providing sample
regulations requiring investigators to “report[ ] . . . all financial interests
relevant to their institutional commitments”).
484. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 370.
485. See id.; cf. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL
ISSUES, “ETHICALLY IMPOSSIBLE”: STD RESEARCH IN GUATEMALA FROM 1946
TO 1948, at 2 (2011), available at http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/
Ethically%20Impossible%20%28with%20linked%20historical%20documents%
29%202.7.13.pdf.
486. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 370, at 2.
487. Id. at 25.
488. Id. at 25–27.
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understandable to subjects.”489 Significantly, apart from one
passing reference in a footnote,490 the Commission’s 208 page
report makes no mention at all of biospecimens or the
ANPRM’s proposals regarding general consent for their future
use. Rather, its approach to the ANPRM appeared to be shaped
by a frame of regulatory oversight as a barrier to scientific
progress, noting early on that “the Commission heard from a
wide range of research professionals that the procedural
requirements of human subjects regulations are often viewed
as unwelcome bureaucratic obstacles to conducting
research.”491
The ANPRM thus serves as a complement to and logical
extension of the GPPC town halls, GINA, and the call for a
duty to participate in research, as they lay the foundations
necessary to sustain and capitalize on the sort of large-scale
longitudinal population studies called for by Francis Collins
back in 2003.492 Each effort is fundamentally oriented toward
overcoming perceived barriers to realizing the potential of
biomedical research in a post-genomic age. First, you must find
potential recruits and identify their interests and concerns.
This was the job of the GPPC’s town halls and related
surveys.493 Second, you need to give recruiters some tools to
address those concerns. Here, GINA emerged as a formal legal
structure that recruiters could invoke to address some of the
primary concerns regarding privacy and discrimination.494
Third, once you have addressed the negative barriers impeding
possible recruitment, you need to develop a message to
encourage potential recruits to take affirmative steps to enroll
in biomedical research studies. Emanuel et al.’s call for a duty
to participate asserted just such a positive claim upon
individuals to enroll in research studies;495 the MVP served as
a military adjunct to this call.496 Fourth, once you have recruits
in the door, you have to minimize the burdens of consent and
489. Id. at 98, 102.
490. Id. at 108 n.14.
491. Id. at 9.
492. See Collins, supra note 36, at 476.
493. See Making Every Voice Count: Public Consultation on Genetics,
Environment, and Health, supra note 57.
494. See supra notes 152–54 and accompanying text.
495. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 1145; see PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N
FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 370, at 2.
496. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
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regulatory oversight, particularly with respect to the type of
information needed for the type of open-ended research central
to large-scale population studies. The ANPRM directly
addresses this issue, setting the stage for the development of
massive new amounts of data that Collins hoped in 2003 would
allow us to realize “the promise of genetic and environmental
research for reducing disease burden on a population basis.”497
IX. NCATS: FROM POPULATIONS TO CORPORATIONS
Once you get people in through the door and obtain their
consent, you ultimately need to use the information resulting
from any study to create the promised therapies meant to
actualize the potential of genomic medicine. Realizing Collins’s
promises, in short, requires more than information and
research. It demands that such research be translated into
viable treatments—most prominently as new pharmaceuticals.
Translational research is the concept of the moment at the
NIH.498 It is framed by a widely held belief that some new
initiative is needed to overcome the “valley of death” between
basic science and applied interventions that obstructs the
development of new molecular entities to treat disease.499 It is
driven by a concern that drug company pipelines are drying up
with no new blockbusters on the horizon.500 So powerful is this
concept that it led to a structural reconfiguration of the NIH to
create the National Center for Advancing Translational Science
(NCATS) in 2011.501
A central component of NCATS’s purpose is to conduct
early stage research on molecular entities that show promise as
potential treatments for disease but are deemed by private
industry as too risky to invest in.502 This might also involve

497. Collins, supra note 36, at 477.
498. Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH to Create National Science Center, SCI. INSIDER
(Dec. 7, 2010, 4:18 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/2010/12/nih-createtranslational-science-center.
499. See David Bornstein, Helping New Drugs out of Research’s ‘Valley of
TIMES
(May
2,
2011,
9:15
PM),
Death’,
N.Y.
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/helping-new-drugs-out-ofacademias-valley-of-death/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
500. Kaiser, supra note 498.
501. Id.
502. Research, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI.,
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/research.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
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rescuing drugs previously seen to be failures.503 An article in
the New York Times analogized NCATS’s role “to that of a
home seller who spruces up properties to attract buyers in a
down market. In this case the center will do as much research
as it needs to do so that it can attract drug company
investment.”504 Collins later described the new Center’s
mission as “catalyz[ing] the generation of innovative methods
and technologies that will enhance the development, testing,
and implementation of diagnostics and therapeutics across a
wide range of diseases and conditions.”505 NCATS boosters
frequently relate need for such a catalyst to data purporting to
show the astronomical cost of bringing a new drug to market—
often in excess of $1 billion.506
Strictly speaking, NCATS is not currently involved in
directly exploiting the information derived from biobanks.507 Its
creation, however, was driven by similar concerns to overcome
barriers to realizing the potential of genomic medicine—most
particularly the perceived bottleneck in drug development.508
There is also a significant continuity in personnel between
these earlier initiatives and NCATS—not only in Francis
Collins, who now oversees all activities at the NIH, but more
particularly in the person of Kathy Hudson. A prominent
promoter of NCATS in 2011, Hudson had by then come to the
NIH where she served as Francis Collins’s deputy director for
science, outreach and policy.509 As director of the GPPC at
Johns Hopkins, Hudson had been instrumental in developing
the town halls and surveys that served as the foundation for
both the NIH’s efforts to explore the feasibility of conducting a
large population study and the Department of Veterans Affairs’

503. Gardiner Harris, Federal Research Center Will Help Develop
Medicines, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2011, at A1.
504. Id. at A25.
505. Collins, supra note 5, at 1.
506. See, e.g., Matthew Harper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5
Billion, Pushing Big Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013, 11:10 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggeringcost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/.
507. Collins, supra note 5, at 3.
508. Id. at 1.
509. RICH MCMANUS, NCATS HOLDS FIRST ALL-STAFF MEETING, OTHERS
EXPECTED, NIH RECORD 1, 6 (2012), available at http://nihrecord.od.nih.gov/
pdfs/2012/03032012_Record.pdf.
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development of the Million Veteran Program.510 By 2012,
Hudson was taking on new duties as acting deputy director of
NCATS.511
NCATS also deals with common concerns regarding the
proper allocation of risk in biomedical research—although it
focuses more on questions of commercial risk than personal.512
Logically building on these earlier initiatives, it constitutes a
model for how best to handle the information produced through
recruitment and research in order to create actual marketable
biomedical products.513 In this regard, it provides a critical
bookend to Emanuel et al.’s privatization of citizenship by
similarly placing the public resources of the NIH’s
infrastructure of publicly supported research at the disposal of
private corporate entities—all in the name of serving the public
good of improved health.514
For fiscal year 2012, NCATS received $576,456,000 in
funding, with the bulk going to support the ongoing Clinical
and Translational Sciences Awards program, which supports a
consortium of medical research institutions working to improve
the way clinical and translational research is conducted
nationwide.515 Other key NCATS initiatives include working
with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the
FDA to develop chips to mimic how humans respond to drugs
so as better to predict drug safety and efficacy; working with
industry to provide academic investigators and small
businesses with the funding and information they need to
investigate new uses for compounds from industry-provided
drug collections; and working with the Environmental
Protection Agency to screen environmental chemicals and
drugs for toxicity.516
Calls to create and fund NCATS consistently invoked the
need to overcome bottlenecks in the drug development pipeline
510. Deputy Directors, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/
almanac/historical/deputy_directors.htm#hudson (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
511. MCMANUS, supra note 509, at 6.
512. Collins, supra note 5, at 2.
513. Id.
514. Id. See generally Emanuel et al., supra note 215 (putting publicly
supported research at the disposal of private corporate entities).
515. Budget Archive, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI.,
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/about/budget/archive.html#fy2012 (last visited Apr.
28, 2014).
516. Collins, supra note 5, at 2–3.
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by “de-risking” early stage research on potential drug
compounds.517 Thus, for example, in 2012 testimony before
Congress seeking appropriations for the coming year, NCATS’s
first acting director Thomas Insel noted that “NCATS will focus
on addressing scientific and technical challenges in order to
reduce, remove, or bypass significant hurdles across the
continuum of translational research;” and went on to assert
that “[k]ey to the success of the NCATS mission is identifying,
studying, and reducing significant bottlenecks in the process of
translation.”518 In 2011, during the run up to creating NCATS,
Francis Collins emphasized the need for public intervention to
address “a downturn in the number of approved new molecular
entities over the last few years,” noting that “drug development
research remains very expensive and the failure rate is
extremely high.”519 Collins here paired the bottleneck in the
drug development pipeline with the idea that such activity is
highly risky, causing pharmaceutical companies to cut back on
research and development.520 “So we have this paradox,”
Collins asserted, “we have a great opportunity to develop truly
new therapeutic approaches, but are undergoing a real
constriction of the pipeline.”521 One solution to the paradox, he
concluded, was creating NCATS to help foster drug
development.522
In reaching this conclusion, Collins argued that “[w]e can’t
count on the biotech community to step in and fill that void [in
research and development] . . . because they are hurting from
an absence of long-term venture capital support.”523 Elsewhere
he stated that an
array of new opportunities should portend a revolution in
therapeutics discovery. . . . [However,] the potential utility of most
of the newly discovered molecular targets will not be easy to
validate. Even worse, the serious challenges that currently

517. Id. at 5.
518. THOMAS INSEL, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET REQUEST 1 (2012), available at
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/FY13-NCATS-Opening-Statement.pdf.
519. Asher Mullard, An Audience with Francis Collins, 10 NATURE REV.
DRUG DISCOVERY 14, 14 (2011).
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id.
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confront the private sector may make it difficult to capitalize on
these new opportunities.524

For Collins, then, market failure in the pharmaceutical
industry implicitly created the essential preconditions for
NCATS.525 In 2011, Garret FitzGerald, McNeill Professor of
Translational Medicine and Therapeutics at the University of
Pennsylvania, echoed Collins’s attention to commercial
problems as creating a space for NCATS when he noted that at
a recent conference “industry representatives pointed out that
drugs in development are often deprioritized for reasons other
than toxicities, especially in this era of repeated mergers.”526
He followed this identification of how non-scientific (“other
than toxicities”) market forces (“mergers”) might be impeding
research and development with a discussion of how NCATS
would be able to “foster industry-academia interactions” by “derisking” approved compounds and pushing to expand a
“precompetitive space” to foster translational medicine.527
These schemes present the fundamental causes of the drug
development bottleneck as economic, not scientific. This
comports well with Collins’s ongoing promotion of the great
potential of genomics to meet important human needs.528 A
January 2011 article on NCATS in the New York Times noted
that “Dr. Collins has been predicting for years that gene
sequencing will lead to a vast array of new treatments, but
years of effort and tens of billions of dollars in financing by
drug makers in gene-related research has largely been a
bust.”529 Collins responded by saying he was “frustrated to see
how many of the discoveries that do look as though they have
therapeutic implications are waiting for the pharmaceutical
industry to follow through with them.”530 In his various
comments, Collins thus located the failure to realize the early
potential of the HGP with industry, not science.531 Moreover,
he emphasized this same commercial failure so as to create the
space for NCATS to intervene into provinces hitherto occupied
524. Collins, supra note 5, at 2.
525. Id. at 5.
526. Garret A. FitzGerald, NCATS Purrs: Emerging Signs of Form and
Function, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., May 18, 2011, at 1, 2.
527. Id. at 2.
528. Collins, supra note 5, at 2.
529. Harris, supra note 503.
530. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
531. Id.
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by industry—early stage drug development.532 Even in the face
of a historical failure to realize the initial promise of the HGP,
Collins still invoked the potential for science to develop new
therapeutic interventions to drive the creation of NCATS.533
Collins cast science as the realm of continued potential,
demanding more support to be actualized, while he laid the
unfulfilled promises of the HGP at the feet of market failure.534
The failures Collins refers to characterize a space that has
come to be known as the “valley of death” between research
discoveries and medical treatments.535 NCATS’s advocates
argue that it will provide a “bridge” over this valley by
conducting early stage research that is too risky for private
industry and developing candidate compounds to the point
where a corporation might step in to license the compound and
bring it forward for more advanced stage clinical trials.536 Dr.
Jon Reed, CEO of the Sanford-Burnham Medical Research
Institute in La Jolla, cast NCATS as “just the shot in the arm
basic research needs to reach forward across that valley.”537
The basic idea here is that risk-induced market failure has led
to a bottleneck that has created a valley that needs to be
bridged.538 There are really two distinct valleys that need to be
bridged here.539 The first is one of translational science—
getting early stage research on potential drugs into late-stage
clinical
trials.540
The
second
is
corporate—getting
pharmaceutical companies interested in investing the funds
necessary to take the drugs across that first bridge.541
The corporate valley of death demands public investment
and a socialization of economic risk to be bridged.542 This

532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. Lili M. Portilla et al., Advancing Translational Research
Collaborations, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Dec. 22, 2010, at 1.
536. Id.
537. John C. Reed, NCATS Could Mitigate Pharma Valley of Death,
GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/ncats-could-mitigate-pharma-valleyof-death/3662/.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
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layering of obstacles to be overcome sets the stage for allocating
massive public resources (i.e., NCATS) to be put at the service
of private enterprise (primarily pharmaceutical companies) in
the name of serving the greater good (improved health).543
Hence we have Collins responding to concerns about “whether
it is appropriate for taxpayer dollars to facilitate the success of
commercial enterprise,” by asserting that “medical advances
that benefit the public generally arise from NIH-funded
biomedical research only if actual products are developed and
brought to market—and partnerships with the private sector
are essential for this translation to succeed.”544 Or, as he put it
in testifying before a Senate subcommittee on appropriations,
“NCATS will benefit all stakeholders, including academia,
biotechnology firms, pharmaceutical companies, the FDA,
and—most importantly—patients and their families.”545 Collins
thus presents NCATS as a win-win, non-zero sum investment
that deserves, indeed demands, public investment because the
ultimate beneficiary will be the public itself. His call to place
the public resources of scientific research at the disposal of
private enterprise provides an institutional counterpart to
Emanuel et al.’s call to place the public resource of citizens’
bodies similarly at the disposal of private enterprise—all for the
greater good.
A. DELINEATING THE PRECOMPETITIVE SPACE
Collins and Thomas Insel took great pains to emphasize
that NCATS was not a government-sponsored drug company
and that its activities would complement, not compete with,
other drug development efforts.546 “As with sequencing of the
human genome,” Collins asserted, “many of the most crucial
challenges confronting translational science today are
precompetitive ones.”547 The particular risks NCATS means to
manage are those populating the precompetitive space where
state intervention may ease the concerns of apprehensive

543. Id.
544. Collins, supra note 5, at 5.
545. Education Appropriations Hearing of NIH FY 2012 Budget Request:
Hearing on S. 1599 Before the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 1
(2011) (testimony of Francis Collins before the Senate Subcommittee on
Labor).
546. See INSEL, supra note 518; Collins, supra note 5, at 5.
547. Collins, supra note 5, at 2.
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corporations wary of investing their own resources in uncertain
endeavors.548 This space is one of commercial promise and
therapeutic potential but also one of risk and danger.549 Here,
the risks to be managed are primarily economic, as manifest in
the high failure rate for candidate drug compounds and the
great expense of drug development.550 These risks are cast as
barriers to realizing the potential of drug development. The
barrier, however, is not the failure rate; it is the reluctance of
private capital to invest in early stage research.
Collins characterized NCATS’s mission as to “identify
opportunities for precompetitive innovation that are not
currently being supported by academic or industry
initiatives.”551 He went on to list such areas as including
virtual drug design, preclinical toxicology, biomarkers, efficacy
testing, phase zero clinical trials, rescuing and repurposing
drugs, clinical trial design, and “postmarketing” research.552 A
2010 Institute of Medicine (IOM) workshop on precompetitive
collaboration identified key players in the space as including
“academic and industry scientists, government entities,
foundations, and patient advocacy groups, or the public at
large;”553 certainly, a rather broad pool from which to draw.
The resulting 2011 IOM report on the workshop, Establishing
Precompetitive Collaborations to Stimulate Genomics-Driven
Product Development, identified the precompetitive space as
one where partnerships may “distribute the risks involved in
research and development.”554 For Collins, many challenges to
genomic progress are precompetitive.555 For the IOM, the
precompetitive space is where relevant risks can be
managed.556 Both views implicitly contrast the competitive

548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id. (detailing the “economic stresses and patent expirations” that
plague pharmaceutical companies).
551. Id. at 3.
552. Id.
553. Jill S. Altshuler et al., Opening Up to Precompetitive Collaboration,
SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Oct. 6, 2010, at 1.
554. STEVE OLSON & ADAM C. BERGER, ESTABLISHING PRECOMPETITIVE
COLLABORATIONS TO STIMULATE GENOMICS-DRIVEN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 2 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog.php?record_id=13015.
555. Collins, supra note 5, at 2–3.
556. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 554, at 2.
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arena of the market as one that increases risk or impedes
productive risk management.
Precisely what constitutes this precompetitive space,
however, is contested and varies depending upon the party
asked to define it. Those using the term generally imply it is
somehow a safe space, a sort of commercial demilitarized zone
where information may be shared without threat of losing some
sort of edge in developing marketable products down the
line.557 Nonetheless, participants at the IOM workshop
recognized that “[a] major challenge is defining the domain of
precompetitive research,”558 going on to note that the
boundaries of precompetitive space may change over time and
across domains, and concluding that “[t]he line may be drawn
differently between academia, diagnostic companies, and
pharmaceutical companies.”559 As Craig Lipset, head of clinical
innovation within worldwide research and development at
Pfizer, put it, “pre-competitive is in the eye of the beholder,”
because “what is pre-competitive to one stakeholder is likely a
key revenue source, business opportunity, or competitive
differentiator to another stakeholder.”560 In an article coauthored with Tania Bubela and E. Richard Gold, Garret
FitzGerald added a temporal dimension to the precompetitive
space, defining it as “the time during R&D in which there is
collaboration but no competition.”561 Echoing Lipset, they went
on to acknowledge that “the line between precompetitive and
competitive research is in constant flux and has shown a
tendency to move increasingly downstream toward clinical or
therapeutic application up to and including proof of concept.”562
They then consider how different actors, with different stakes,
may have different conceptions of the precompetitive space.563
Small biotechnology companies, for example, may have an
interest in expanding competitive space upstream to basic
557.
558.
559.
560.

Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
Craig Lipset, Consortia—Pre-Competitive Is in the Eye of the Beholder,
PHARMASHERPA (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.pharmasherpa.com/2008/12/
consortia-pre-competitive-is-in-eye-of.html.
561. Tania Bubela et al., Recalibrating Intellectual Property Rights to
Enhance Translational Research Collaborations, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED.,
Feb. 22, 2012, at 3.
562. Id.
563. Id. at 3–4.
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proofs of concept which may form the basis for patents that are
central to their business models.564 Allowing such a free
upstream extension of patent rights, however, may deter
downstream innovation by larger companies and unnecessarily
add to the overall cost of drug development.565
What this often seems to come down to are legal questions
of intellectual property (IP). Simply stated, a precompetitive
space appears to be a space where patents cannot, or should
not go.566 As Collins put it, the precompetitive space is one “in
which intellectual property claims are expected to be
limited.”567 A 2010 Wellcome Trust report on “Precompetitive
Drug Boundaries” emphasized that “there needs to be more
research conducted in an IP-free environment and more
flexibility with existing IP by both academia and industry.”568
Similarly, the 2011 IOM Report, asserted that, “numerous
issues such as intellectual property (IP) protections and
funding can be cumbersome or completely inhibitory to
establishing collaborative ventures and must be overcome to
facilitate this process and realize the potentially immense
benefits.”569 Prominent among the key points raised by
speakers at the IOM workshop was that “[e]stablishing IP-free
zones would open new areas of R&D to precompetitive
collaboration.”570 Here the IOM cast IP not only as obstructing
collaboration, but as inhibiting the construction of a
precompetitive space itself.571
Bubela, FitzGerald, and Gold argue that when IP rights
intrude into precompetitive space, where most discovery has
little or no commercial value, they act as “a real drag on the
innovation system” by keeping “competitively focused actors—
most often small biotechnology companies—alive despite the

564. Id. at 4.
565. Id.
566. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 554, at 49–50 (discussing IP-free zones
as one potential solution to precompetition problems).
567. Collins, supra note 5, at 5.
568. WELLCOME TRUST, PRECOMPETITIVE DRUG BOUNDARIES: OPEN
INNOVATION IN DRUG DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2010), available at
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@policy_
communications/documents/web_document/wtvm050558.pdf.
569. OLSON & BERGER, supra note 554, at 2.
570. Id. at 49.
571. Id. at 49–50.
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inefficiencies of doing so.”572 In this scheme, precompetitive
space is a place where IP may do more harm than good. It is
therefore a normative space—a place where patents may be
able to go, but should not go because of the bad effect they have
on innovation. This bad effect is due not to the existence of
patents per se, but to their premature introduction into the
stream of invention.573 Ideally, patents are supposed to serve as
an efficient spur to innovation, but in a precompetitive space
patents are seen to inhibit efficiency.574 The boundaries of
precompetitive space are thus here defined in part by inverting
the logic of patent law: patents are supposed to increase
efficiency; therefore they should not be allowed to go where
they undermine efficiency.575 This is one way to define
precompetitive space.
In the context of promoting NCATS, IP thus emerges as a
new and distinctive barrier to realizing the potential of genomic
medicine. Previous barriers to realizing this potential primarily
involved human subjects: overcoming resistance to
participation by gauging the attitudes of potential recruits,576
inculcating a sense of duty to participate,577 and reducing
regulatory burdens of consent.578 In the realm of translational
science, the barriers are legal and commercial.579 NCATS’s
advocates characterize it as an instrument to create a space
where such impediments cannot enter.580 In this hallowed
space of translational research, public resources may also be
“translated” into private profit by de-risking early stage
research to the point where corporate enterprises might be
interested in taking over the reins of further research and
development.581 This point of hand-off presents yet another

572. Bubela et al., supra note 561, at 3.
573. Id. at 4.
574. Cf. id. at 2 (describing how collaborations, which may involve patent
sharing, use resources more efficiently when conducting research).
575. WELLCOME TRUST, supra note 568, at 5 (“Patenting stifles
innovation.”).
576. See supra Part I.
577. See supra Part III.
578. See supra Part VIII.
579. Bubela et al., supra note 561, at 1.
580. Id. at 3–4.
581. WELLCOME TRUST, supra note 568, at 5–6 (discussing public-private
partnerships).
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market to define the limits of the precompetitive space.582 It
also defines the point at which corporate interests effectively
privatize public resources—both monetary and intellectual—
first through IP rights and later through general commercial
development and marketing.583 More than this, it also marks
the point at which the Emanuel et al.’s call to service effectively
completes the privatization of citizenship—turning over the
benefits of public participation in clinical research and
biobanking to private interests.584
B. THE ALCHEMY OF PRECOMPETITIVE SPACE
Though never explicitly discussed as such, the space
occupied by human subjects recruitment and consent processes
may also be characterized as precompetitive.585 Though
marketing techniques surely have been central to the discipline
of recruitmentology, recruiters themselves generally take great
pains to contain the scope and reach of market forces in the
process.586 This is especially true with respect to IP rights, the
key to delimiting the precompetitive space.587 Thus, while on
occasion potential subjects may receive a modicum of
compensation for their participation, they are almost never
given an interest in the products derived from the information
contained in their bodies.588
When it comes to NCATS, the notion of a precompetitive
space provides an additional structuring metaphor to
complement pipelines, bottlenecks, valleys, and bridges.
Precompetitive space is presented as an arena where public
and private, academia and industry, science and commerce can
co-exist without conflict.589 It is an alchemical arena of
translation—most explicitly where basic research is translated
into usable therapies, but it is also an arena where public

582. Id.
583. Id.
584. See supra notes 253–56 and accompanying text.
585. Collins, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing experimenting with clinical trial
design).
586. Id.
587. Bubela et al., supra note 561, at 3 (“[T]he economic impact of patents
in the life sciences . . . have been hotly debated.”).
588. The story of Henrietta Lacks is an early example of this practice. See,
e.g., SKLOOT, supra note 480.
589. Bubela et al., supra note 561, at 1.
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resources are translated into private profits and where private
risk is socialized into a public burden.590
Such concerns are prominent in a critique by Harvard
Professors of Medicine and Public Health Jerry Avorn and
Aaron Kesselheim of the assumptions underlying the creation
of NCATS. In an article published in Nature Medicine titled
The NIH Translational Research Center Might Trade Public
Risk for Private Reward, they make clear their concerns that
the model of de-risking research for industry places a double
burden on taxpayers “who pay once for drug development and
again for heavily marked-up products.”591 As they put it:
“NCATS could require the public to absorb even more of the
costs of risky basic biomedical research and then hand off the
fruits of such investigation to manufacturers that have
traditionally not been generous in sharing the profits from
medications based on such discoveries.”592
This amounts to a biomedical analogue of analyses of the
2008 financial crisis; arguing that providing bailouts to major
financial interests amounted to socializing the risks of
corporate speculation, while allowing those same corporations
to privatize the profits underwritten by such state support.593
De-risking, then, is not simply a means of spurring upstream
research into potential drug candidates; it is also a means of
transferring resources from public to private hands.594 To a
degree, the same can be said about the entire enterprise of
recruiting participants for large-scale population studies. As

590. Id. at 5.
591. Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The NIH Translational Research
Center Might Trade Public Risk for Private Reward, 17 NATURE MED. 1176,
1176 (2011), available at http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v17/n10/full/
nm1011-1176.html.
592. Id.
593. See, e.g., BAILOUTS: PUBLIC MONEY, PRIVATE PROFIT (Robert E.
Wright ed., 2010); Nouriel Roubini, Is Purchasing $700 Billion of Toxic Assets
the Best Way to Recapitalize the Financial System? No! It Is Rather a Disgrace
and Rip-Off Benefitting Only the Shareholders and Unsecured Creditors of
Banks, NOURIEL ROUBINI’S GLOBAL ECONOMONITOR (Sept. 28, 2008),
http://www.economonitor.com/nouriel/2008/09/28/is-purchasing-700-billion-oftoxic-assets-the-best-way-to-recapitalize-the-financial-system-no-it-is-rathera-disgrace-and-rip-off-benefitting-only-the-shareholders-and-unsecuredcreditors-of-banks/.
594. Cf. FitzGerald, supra note 526, at 1 (“NIH did not plan to compete
with the private sector but, rather, to facilitate its efforts in drug discovery
and development.”).
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there may be latent potential value in unexamined molecular
entities, so too may there be latent value in the information
contained in unexamined individual bodies. Like NCATS, the
call for a duty to participate in research facilitates the
appropriation and transfer of the value inhering in public
resources (in the form both of human bodies and in the very
concept of citizenship itself) into private (corporate) hands. This
is the inverse of what political scientist Jacob Hacker has
called the “great risk shift,” whereby an array of state
sponsored social insurance programs—including health care—
have been progressively dismantled and privatized, shifting the
risks of ill-health, unemployment, and retirement upon isolated
individuals and families.595 Here, the state is creating new
institutions, such as NCATS, to shift the risks of biomedical
research from private corporations to the public.
Avorn and Kesselheim also question some of the basic
assumptions driving the creation of NCATS.596 They begin by
noting that a disproportionate number of new products recently
approved by the FDA (approximately two-thirds) are me-too
drugs, members of an existing therapeutic class or else merely
equivalent in efficacy to existing drugs already on the
market.597 They argue that this reality undermines “the
assumption underlying NCATS . . . that many potential drug
targets or compounds have been identified but are not being
adequately exploited.”598 If this were the case, then creating
NCATS to “pursue leads that drug companies or investors have
overlooked or have chosen not to invest in” would make
sense.599 But, they ask: “Are there really many clinically
promising compounds or targets that have been discovered but
are languishing, neglected, in some laboratory—or that remain
unexploited even though their properties are known?”600
Beyond certain antibiotics, Avorn and Kesselheim are
skeptical.601
B.H. Munos of the InnoThink Center for Research in
Biomedical Innovation and W.W. Chin of Harvard Medical
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.

HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 14, at 6.
Avorn & Kesselheim, supra note 591, at 1176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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School upend Collins’s discourse of risk by positing that drug
companies need to take on more, not less risk, for the simple
reason that reward correlates with risk.602 They argue that
much of the current contraction in the drug pipeline has its
roots in “the adoption of a new research model that swept the
industry in the mid-1990s” that directed inordinate amounts of
research and development resources toward finding
blockbuster drugs.603 This model involved portfolio managers
shunning risk in favor of pursuing a blockbuster drug
development model that involved pursuing only “safe”
incremental innovation.604 As a result, “[w]here bold vision
once ruled, cautious analytics now prevail.”605 They actually
find the drug pipeline to be “gushing,” but, like Avorn and
Kesselheim, they find it producing marginal therapeutics that
“struggle to rise above the standard of care or even placebo.”606
These safe drugs actually may be crowding the pipeline and
diverting resources from more innovative approaches to drug
development.607
To these critiques, Brandeis professor of biochemistry
Gregory Petsko adds his belief that “the reason Collins is doing
[NCATS] is that he is beset by people—in the U.S. Congress
and from patient advocacy groups—who keep asking him,
‘Where are all the cures you promised us?’”608 For Petsko,
NCATS is not simply about addressing a bottleneck in the drug
development pipeline, it is Collins’s latest attempt to maintain
ongoing support for the successive promises made on behalf of
genomic medicine going back two decades.609 Echoing Avorn
and Kesselheim, Petsko goes on to argue that problems
underlying the slow-down in new drug approvals lie not in the
risks of early stage research but in the recent “merger mania”
among major pharmaceutical companies that has “often
resulted in bloated entities that are so busy managing the

602. Munos & Chin, supra note 344, at 1.
603. Id.
604. Id.
605. Id. at 2.
606. Id.
607. Id.
608. Gregory A. Petsko, Herding CATS, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Aug.
24, 2011, at 1.
609. Id.
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problems caused by the merger that they have forgotten how to
make drugs.”610
These critiques raise the question of whether lack of
innovation is a symptom or a cause of the high risk of new drug
development and the bottleneck in the pipeline. The lack of
innovation indicated by the focus on profit-proven me-too drugs
(e.g., the fifth statin or the twentieth beta-blocker)611 may
actually produce a higher level of risk for developing new
therapeutics; this for the simple reason that the safe return on
investment for a me-too drug makes the risks involved in
pursuing a new, first-in-class drug appear relatively even
greater.
Francis Collins and other supporters of NCATS tell a fairly
straightforward story of how it will help promote innovation
and ultimately serve the public good: the need arises from an
identified slow-down in new drug development that is assumed
to be grounded in a reluctance to engage in risky early stage
research given the high cost of bringing a new therapeutic
compound to the market;612 NCATS can mobilize public
resources to begin to analyze some of the literally thousands of
untested molecular entities already stored in various public
and private libraries and identify promising candidates for
further development;613 when NCATS initiatives develop
evidence that a particular candidate shows concrete promise of
becoming an effective therapeutic, then a drug company can
step in and invest the funds to conduct the large-scale clinical
trials needed to bring the drug to the FDA for approval.614
The critics tell a different story. For them, NCATS is part
of a questionable attempt to address the wrong problem that is
more likely to succeed in transferring massive public resources
into private hands than it is to address any meaningful
bottlenecks in new drug development.615 They see industry’s
reluctance to engage in translational research as rooted in the
610. Id. at 3.
611. Avorn & Kesselheim, supra note 591, at 1176 (finding that two-thirds
of newly approved drugs in 2009–2010 were substantially similar to available
treatments and that “we clearly need more and better innovation”).
612. Collins, supra note 5, at 1–2.
613. Mullard, supra note 519, at 14.
614. Collins, supra note 5, at 2.
615. Petsko, supra note 608, at 3 (“Why should pharmaceutical companies
increase their [research & development] spending if the government is putting
its own money into solving the industry’s problems?”).
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search for the quick and easy profits of me-too drugs,
augmented by constraints imposed by recent structural
changes in the corporate organization of the pharmaceutical
industry that further inhibit innovation.616
Two recent studies, one concerning the productivity crisis
in pharmaceutical research and development, the other
examining preclinical cancer research, when viewed in relation
to each other, raise additional questions about the logic
underlying NCATS. The first article, authored by Fabio
Pammolli, Laura Magazzini, and Massimo Riccaboni, argues
that:
[T]he decline in the productivity of pharmaceutical R&D cannot be
fully explained by the forces of demand and competition, and we
document an increasing focus of research activities in the
development of selective drugs in complex research areas that are
characterized by a low probability of success (POS). It seems that
research efforts have been reoriented towards more difficult
targets, while the number of options that can yield viable therapies
has grown dramatically. Consequently, the cost of R&D of new
drugs has risen.617

In particular, the authors note that “the increase in the
number of R&D projects targeting specific cancers is the main
driver behind the reorienting of the R&D effort during the past
decade.”618 Their analysis shows these projects had the lowest
of possibility of success of the range of classes examined; hence
the decline in productivity.619 The argument here is that the
class of drugs being developed was centrally related to the
rising rate of failure.
The second article, by C. Glenn Begley and Lee M. Ellis,
examined the failure to translate basic cancer research into
viable new therapies, noting that “clinical trials in oncology
have the highest failure rate compared with other therapeutic
areas.”620 At first, this would seem to comport nicely with the
work of Pammolli et al., noting the very low possibility of

616. Id.
617. Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical
R&D, 10 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 428 (2011), available at
http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/twiki/pub/LawNetSoc/BahradSokhansanjFirs
tPaper/10NatRevDrugDisc428_pharma_productivity_crisis_2011.pdf.
618. Id. at 433.
619. Id. at 436.
620. C. Glenn Begley & Lee M. Ellis, Raise Standards for Preclinical
Cancer Research, 483 NATURE 531, 531 (2012).
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success in cancer research and development.621 Begley and
Ellis, however, went beyond the statistics of rate of success to
look at the underlying studies that drove the clinical trials.
They found that the failure rate was not related to the “highrisk” nature of oncology research and development, but to the
basic quality of the research itself.622 They discussed a study
conducted by Amgen (in which Begley participated) that tried
to confirm published findings relating to oncology in fifty-three
studies published in “landmark” journals (papers in top
journals, from reputable labs).623 Of the fifty-three papers, the
Amgen study found only six (eleven percent) were replicated.624
Begley and Ellis noted that “[i]n studies for which findings
could be reproduced, authors had paid close attention to
controls, reagents, investigator bias, and describing the
complete data set. For results that could not be reproduced,
however, data were not routinely analyzed by investigators
blinded to the experimental versus control groups.”625
Moreover, the article goes on to note that its findings are
consistent with those of a separate study conducted by Bayer
HealthCare in Germany that found only about twenty-five
percent of published preclinical studies could be validated to
the point at which projects could continue.626 “It was shocking,”
Begley told Reuters:
These are the studies the pharmaceutical industry relies on to
identify new targets for drug development. But if you’re going to
place a $1 million or $2 million or $5 million bet on an observation,
you need to be sure it’s true. As we tried to reproduce these papers
we became convinced you can’t take anything at face value.627

621. See Pammolli et al., supra note 617, at 430 tbl.1 (noting that research
and development projects focused on antineoplastic and immunomodulating
agents, which are both forms of cancer treatment, had an average possibility
of success of 1.80%).
622. Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 532.
623. Id.
624. Id.
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. Sharon Begley, In Cancer Science, Many “Discoveries” Don’t Hold Up,
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/usscience-cancer-idUSBRE82R12P20120328.
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As the Nature editorial accompanying the article noted, “there
are too many careless mistakes creeping into scientific
papers—in our pages and elsewhere.”628
When you connect the Begley and Ellis article to the one by
Pammolli et al. you get a very different view of some possible
reasons why the drug pipeline may be drying up. If, as
Pammolli et al. show, pharmaceutical R&D is increasingly
focused on developing cancer drugs and if, as the Amgen study
shows, the overwhelming majority of studies driving the
clinical trials underlying the development of new cancer drugs
are flawed, then perhaps the “valley of death”629 NCATS is
seeking to bridge has not been caused by a lack of translational
research but by fundamental problems in the way the basic
research itself is being conducted. If this is the case, then the
rationale for establishing NCATS must be called into
question—or at the very least, reexamined in light of these
findings.
Perhaps as significant as the findings of the Amgen study
are what Begley and Ellis identify as possible causes of the
problem. They note that the investigators studied “were all
competent, well-meaning scientists who truly wanted to make
advances in cancer research.”630 The problems they hypothesize
were more structural and individual:
To obtain funding, a job, promotion or tenure, researchers need a
strong publication record, often including a first-authored highimpact publication. Journal editors, reviewers and grant-review
committees often look for a scientific finding that is simple, clear
and complete—a ‘perfect’ story. It is therefore tempting for
investigators to submit selected data sets for publication, or even to
massage data to fit the underlying hypothesis.631

Commenting on the Amgen study, Ken Kaitin, director of the
Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, noted, “[i]f
you can write it up and get it published you’re not even
thinking of reproducibility . . . . You make an observation and
move on. There is no incentive to find out it was
wrong.”632 Indeed, all the incentives work in the other

628. Editorial: Must Try Harder, NATURE (Mar. 28,
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v483/n7391/full/483509a.html.
629. Reed, supra note 537.
630. Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 532.
631. Id.
632. Begley, supra note 627.
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direction—obtaining tenure, grant funding, or prestige all
depends on high profile publications.633
In recent years, as biomedicine has become an idealized
golden goose for many major research universities, additional
incentives may be driving the premature publication of results
that directly relate academic standing to commercialization of
research. Most obvious in this regard has been the broad rise in
patent applications streaming from research universities and
the concomitant rise of industry-academia collaborations.634 In
an article in Science Translational Medicine, titled Why
University-Industry Partnerships Matter, Anthony Boccanfuso
lauds this development, noting that “some academic
institutions have excelled at creating a supportive
environment, and many more institutions are embracing this
approach.”635 His model in this regard is Texas A&M, which
“claims to be the first public university to officially consider
technology commercialization in tenure and promotion
decisions.”636 For “technology commercialization,”637 one might
just as easily read “translational research.” Texas A&M, then,
is engaged in precisely the type of effort NCATS aims to
support.
Pammolli et al. identified a trend toward R&D investments
in the high-risk, low probability of success area of cancer
drugs.638 Begley and Ellis identified shoddy cancer research
that might be producing the low probability of success
identified by Pammolli et al.639 Begley and Ellis further
identified some systemic problems incentivizing the production
of such research, central among these being tenure, grants, and
prestige, not to mention editorial preferences for neat “stories”
of successful research.640 Boccanfuso presents an additional
incentive for publication at all costs by connecting

633. See Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 533.
634. See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST 79–
81 (2003); PHILLIP MIROWSKI, SCIENCE-MART: PRIVATIZING AMERICAN
SCIENCE 144–52 (2011).
635. Anthony M. Boccanfuso, Why University-Industry Partnerships
Matter, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Sept. 29, 2010, at 2.
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Pammolli et al., supra note 617, at 437.
639. Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 532.
640. Id. at 533.
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commercialization to tenure.641 While he praises this
development, it may be feeding precisely into the dynamic
driving the systemic problems identified by Begley and Ellis.
NCATS embraces the translational approach of industryacademia collaboration discussed by Boccanfuso. It is premised
on an idea that such collaboration will produce the research
breakthroughs needed to replenish the anemic drug pipeline.642
But given the findings of the Amgen study, NCATS may be
targeting the wrong problem. If Begley and Ellis are correct,
then NCATS, particularly when viewed in relation to
initiatives such as those pursued by Texas A&M, may be
feeding into the unhealthy dynamic that incentivized the
production of so much shoddy cancer research in the first place.
An uncritical promotion of translational research thus has the
potential to exacerbate the very problem it is seeking to
address.
For example, to the extent that research papers published
in high profile journals (which themselves are often the
subjects of patents) form a basis for technology
commercialization, a dynamic of tenure review and potential
profit provide a strong incentive for producing exactly the type
of research that Begley and Ellis find to be so problematic.643
Their critique shows up the false dream of trying to demarcate
distinct and independent spheres of science and commerce in
modern practice.
While Collins and other boosters of unfettered biomedical
potential may try to locate barriers to progress external to the
scientific enterprise, (whether in corporate risk aversion,
regulatory hurdles, or citizen reluctance to enroll in biobanks),
in fact, these domains are inextricably interwoven, each shaping
and creating the conditions under which they all develop.
Commercial considerations of drug development, in particular,
may be directly shaping how scientific questions are being
framed, pursued, and disseminated644—not simply in the heavy
handed direct examples of suppression of problematic research

641. Boccanfuso, supra note 635, at 2.
642. See id. at 1.
643. See Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 533 (arguing that “[t]he
academic system and peer-review process tolerates and perhaps even
inadvertently encourages” publishing “erroneous, selective or irreproducible
data”).
644. Id.
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results documented in such notorious cases as Vioxx645—but in
day-to-day scientific practice or the sort examined by Begley
and Ellis.646 More money, “de-risking” research, or creating a
“precompetitive space” will not suffice to address this issue. An
understanding of the interconnectedness of these domains and
practices is essential to realizing the type of progress Collins
and others envision for our collective biomedical future.
X. CONCLUSION: CUI BONO? RISK, DUTY, AND
POTENTIAL IN THE CIRCLE OF PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE
Francis Collins’s interest in following up the HGP with a
large-scale population study and his promotion of NCATS
bookend this story. Throughout, Collins cast the major barriers
to realizing the potential of genomic medicine as exterior to the
scientific enterprise itself, residing in the domains of society,
law, and the market.647 As the sequencing of the first human
genome did not in itself bring us to the promised land of
genomic medicine, Collins and others identified bodies as the
primary barrier to proceeding down this road of potential.648
Science needed massive numbers of bodies enrolled in LPSs to
get the information necessary to achieve genomic
breakthroughs.649 The barriers to recruitment were cast as
social and legal. Prominent among social barriers were
ignorance, fear, and inertia;650 among legal barriers were
regulatory oversight and informed consent.651
The GPPC town halls and surveys were designed to figure
out ways to address popular ignorance and fear. Ignorance was
to be addressed through education and outreach. Whatever
fears were not addressed by education, GINA would resolve by

645. See, e.g., CARL ELLIOTT, WHITE COAT, BLACK HAT: ADVENTURES ON
DARK SIDE OF MEDICINE 41–42, 103–07 (2010); Merril Goozner, Conflicts
of Interest in the Drug Industry’s Relationship with the Government, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 737, 743 (2006).
646. See Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 532.
647. Mullard, supra note 519, at 14.
648. Collins, supra note 36, at 475.
649. Id.
650. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 67; Genetic Discrimination, supra
note 156.
651. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,512 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56); SACHRP Letter, supra note 459, at 30–31.
THE
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assuring potential recruits that their genetic information could
not be used to discriminate against them.652 Emanuel et al.’s
call for a duty to participate aimed to overcome citizen inertia,
providing a normative, if not formally legal, incentive to get
new recruits in the door.653 Revisions to the Common Rule were
to serve, in part, to lessen and regularize the regulatory
burdens of consenting recruits and providing ongoing oversight
of the information derived from their participation.654
Once researchers had bodies to work on, promoters of
NCATS located the barriers to fulfilling genomic potential in
the realm of law and the market. Creating a precompetitive
space where government and academic scientists could de-risk
early stage research would compensate for market failures of
the pharmaceutical industry that had created bottlenecks in
the drug development pipeline.655 In the enterprise of
translational science, patents themselves could act as barriers
to realizing potential if they were not kept in their proper
place.656 Central to the idea of the precompetititve space was
delimiting an area where IP rights could or should not attach
to innovation.657
NCATS is merely the most recent federally sponsored
initiative intended to realize the full potential of genomic
medicine. From the Human Genome Project itself, to the
NIH/GPPC town halls, GINA, Emanuel et al.’s call for a duty to
participate, the MVP, and revisions to the Common Rule,
diverse federal actors centering primarily around the NIH have
been making demands upon public resources—bodily, civic,
intellectual, and monetary—in the name of serving a common
good of better public health and well-being. Diverse critiques of
NCATS and the broader privatization of science call upon us to
recontextualize these initiatives, particularly as those
promoting them have tended to elide the way in which they
appropriate these myriad resources into the hands of private
corporate interests. This appropriation may be accomplished
fairly directly, as in NCATS’s move to de-risk early stage
652. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 65, at 14.
653. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 68–70 (aligning the civic duty to
vote with the duty to participate in research).
654. Human Subjects Research Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. at 44,521–22.
655. See Collins, supra note 5, at 1.
656. See FitzGerald, supra note 526, at 2.
657. See id.
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research for drug companies.658 But it has also been
accomplished more subtly through a manipulation of the very
concepts of risk, duty, and barriers to realizing potential
underlying these diverse initiatives. There are, in short, two
pipelines driving these initiatives: one is the explicitly defined
pipeline for innovative therapeutics to improve health; the other
is a tacit pipeline to privatize public resources (including
citizenship itself) and to socialize risk for corporate interests.
A. ASYMMETRIES OF RISK
Tropes of risk run throughout this story, carrying different
valences and implications depending on where they appear.
Broadly speaking the story identifies three areas of risk on the
road to realizing the potential of genomic medicine:
Individual—harm to research subjects; Legal—primarily in the
form of potential liability for harm to research subjects, but
also as regulatory burdens and obstructive IP rights; and
Commercial—as market failure and loss of return on
investment. Significantly, these risks are generally cast as
external to the scientific enterprise.659 Except for the external
critics of the NCATS model, there is very little discussion of
any risks that might inhere within scientific practice itself.
Rather, promoters of these diverse federal initiatives
consistently locate the risks of failure in the purportedly
distinct realms of society, law, and commerce. In doing so, they
also mask the way risk-talk mediates between knowledge and
power, in particular the ways in which even the most
technologically framed assessments of risk in regulatory
contexts invariably implicate value judgments about such
matters as what counts as risk, how and by whom it is to be
assessed, and by reference to what values its significance is to
be gauged.660
Framing and addressing risk plays a central role in the
recruitment of subjects to biobanks and other large-scale
population studies. Recruiters articulate risk in recruitment in
two distinct but overlapping registers. The first is exemplified
by Francis Collins’s initial call in 2003 for the development of

658. See Collins, supra note 5, at 2.
659. See Reed, supra note 537 (describing how the initial drug development
process is not undertaken by risk averse pharmaceutical companies).
660. See, e.g., JASANOFF, supra note 15, at 134–35, 156–60.
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LPSs without which the genomic enterprise may be
jeopardized.661 At a 2011 IOM workshop on “Public
Engagement and Clinical Trials,” Dr. Jeffrey Drazen, Editor-inChief of the New England Journal of Medicine, articulated this
first concern in relation to a second type of risk to research
subjects themselves, stating “that unless we can persuade more
people to put themselves at risk, the rate at which we will be
gathering knowledge will become smaller and smaller.”662 He
acknowledges that “[p]rogress requires a population willing to
put itself at risk,”663 but implies that a failure of citizens to take
such risks upon themselves itself constitutes a risk to
biomedical progress that the IOM must address through such
measures as public engagement.664 The only way to reduce the
risk to medical progress posed by low recruitment is to convince
potential subjects to take a different type of risk upon
themselves. This is not quite a risk shift, in that there are two
distinct types of risks at issue here. It does illustrate, however,
how different risks may be interrelated and made dependent
upon one another.
In the realm of genomic research, Collins and others cast
the primary risks to potential recruits as informational rather
than bodily (as might be the case in, for example,
pharmaceutical clinical trials).665 The ANPRM for the Common
Rule states that, “[s]ince there would be new mandatory
standards for data security and information protection to
address informational risks, only non-informational risks
would be considered in determining the level of risk posed by
research studies.”666 This presents informational risk as
primarily a technical problem susceptible of management by
improved data security standards. GINA similarly involves

661. See Collins, supra note 36, at 475–77; supra notes 35–39 and
accompanying text.
662. VICTORIA WEISFELD ET AL., PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT AND CLINICAL
TRIALS: NEW MODELS AND DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY
3 (2011), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13237
(internal quotation marks omitted).
663. Id.
664. See id.
665. See, e.g., Emanuel & Menikoff, supra note 439, at 1146.
666. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,516 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
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managing informational risk.667 Its advocates presented it as a
means to address the fears of potential recruits.668 But many of
these same advocates viewed those fears as minimal or
irrational. For them, GINA’s real purpose was less to manage
information risks per se than, by so doing, to manage the
underlying risk that a failure of recruitment would pose to
medical progress.669 This stands in stark contrast to how
promoters of NCATS (often the same people) tend to treat
corporate wariness of risky investment in early stage research
as rational economic behavior that needs to be accommodated
by providing public support for translational research.
Where GINA and related efforts at recruitment invoked
risk in framing their aims and purpose, the Common Rule more
directly engages the parameters of acceptable risk in human
subjects research. The fundamental role of the IRBs
established pursuant to the Common Rule is “to ensure that
the risks have been minimized to the extent reasonably
possible and that any remaining risks are justified by the
benefits the study is likely to achieve.”670 This befits the Rule’s
emergence from the tradition that gave rise to both the
Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration. Yet, the
dominant theme of GINA and NCATS is “de-risking” aspects of
research to promote participation and development. This
imperative presents a possible challenge to the Common Rule.
While the purpose of the Common Rule is to minimize risk
to human subjects, discussions of the need to revise it were
informed by references to legal, regulatory, and commercial
risk.671 The ANPRM itself was framed by references to key
concerns that the burdens of regulatory oversight were “not
adequately calibrating the review process to the risk of
research” and general “inefficiencies” in the process that
inhibited
both
research
and
subsequent
product
development.672 In commenting on the ANPRM to revise the

667. See, e.g., Genetic Discrimination, supra note 156.
668. See, e.g., id.
669. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 202, at 1146.
670. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 418, at 245.
671. Emanuel & Menikoff, supra note 439, at 1145–48.
672. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,513 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
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Common Rule, the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human
Research Protections attributed the long and legalistic nature
of current standard consent forms to concerns “about
minimizing the potential risk of adverse legal actions” and
“regulatory oversight.”673 Managing these diverse types of risk
can create tensions between the interests of the parties they
threaten: research subjects, researchers, and institutions.
NCATS, of course, is suffused with the language of risk
management. It exists to de-risk early stage research. Looking
at the nature of the process more closely, however, we see that
NCATS does not actually aim to make the scientific endeavor of
research itself any less risky. That is, the development of
cooperative endeavors in the precompetitive space does not aim
to change how scientists proceed with the work of discovery,
merely the external conditions under which discovery occurs.
The risks NCATS seeks to manage are the legal and
commercial risk that may be driving pharmaceutical
corporations away from basic research.674 Creating a
precompetititve space is meant to reduce the threat posed by IP
rights to the free flow of ideas among potential collaborators—
patents can be risky things; and de-risking itself focuses on
shifting the risk of commercial failure from private to public
institutions. Such commercial risk, of course, is bound up with
the risk of scientific failure, but it is not the same thing. The
NCATS model does not manage the risk of scientific failure; it
manages the commercial risk such failure poses to
pharmaceutical companies. It is premised on drawing a clear
line between commercial and scientific risk as operating
independently of one another. This stands in stark contrast to
the critiques by the likes of Munos and Chin who argue that
risk aversion within scientific practice itself is a problem;675 or
the evidence brought to light by Begley and Pammolli
challenging as problematic research strategies that focus on
drug development in the class of cancer drugs, which have a
high risk of failure;676 or finally, the implication that
commercial risk itself is shaping the way scientific risks are
being conceptualized, framed, and addressed. Keeping science
673. SACHRP Letter, supra note 459, at 14–15.
674. See Collins, supra note 5, at 2.
675. Munos & Chin, supra note 344, at 2.
676. Begley & Ellis, supra note 620, at 532; Pammolli et al., supra note
617, at 431.
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separate from law and commerce, however, allows advocates to
more effectively make demands upon citizens and the state to
realize its latent potential.
This regime of biomedical progress constructed a basic
asymmetry in assignment of risks between individuals and
corporations—just as there is with duties imposed. Great pains
are taken to reduce or eliminate risks for corporations as a way
of bringing them to the table of drug development. Risks to
individuals, however, are managed by being cast largely as a
technical function of information management. The work
involved in creating a large-scale population study actually
produces risks for individuals. To be sure, legal regimes such as
GINA are intended to manage these new risks but the ANPRM
also proposes ways for those risks, in effect, to exist for
indeterminate amounts of time as research on biospecimens
may be conducted into the indefinite future.677
B. DUTIES WITHOUT RIGHTS
Citizen duties bracket the biomedical enterprise. At the
front end, we have Emanuel et al.’s call for an obligation to
participate in research in order to realize the potential of
genomic medicine.678 This participation provides the basis for
developing new biomedical products and services. At the back
end we have Rose and Novas’s idea of a biological citizen with a
duty to act as an informed consumer of these products and
services.679 Heath, Rapp, and Taussig’s idea of genetic
citizenship provides an alternative model of a more engaged
and less atomized citizen, bound together by common concerns
to make demands on government and industry.680 This model,
however, appears limited to more interest group-like, conditionspecific activism, much like Epstein’s notion of biopolitical
citizenship.681 The duties of the biological citizen as consumer
embrace us all, along the lines of Childerhose’s more coercive
conception of genomic citizenship, where we are all deemed
ultimately creatures of our genes with concomitant obligations
to put our genetic information at the service of the public
677. Jessica Berg & Nicole Deming, New Rules for Research with Human
Participants?, 41 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 10, 10 (2011).
678. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 68–70.
679. Rose & Novas, supra note 293, at 445–48.
680. Heath et al., supra note 290, at 159.
681. See EPSTEIN, supra note 292, at 282.
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good.682 We enter this cycle of pharmaceutical life with a duty
to be consumed—to put our bodies at the disposal of biomedical
research. We complete the cycle with a duty to consume the
resulting products and services—thereby exercising proper care
of ourselves. These duties effectively privatize citizenship,
recasting service to the political community as a function of
service to the corporate enterprise of biomedical research,
development, and marketing.
Yet, unlike the traditional models of civic duty, there are
no corresponding rights paired with these duties. In the
conceptualization of biobanks, the GPPC and others simply did
not entertain the idea that recruits might have an affirmative
right of access to the data derived from their participation (as,
for example, they have in the Estonian biobank referenced in
the GPPC promotional materials).683 At most, they conceived of
subjects’ rights as market-based goods to be bargained over as
an incentive to recruitment. Similarly, in their call for a duty to
participate in biomedical research, Emanuel et al. never
posited a concomitant right of access to health care, nor has
there been any articulation of a right of access on reasonable
terms to the products developed by private corporations
through the public support from NCATS.
Emanuel et al. invoked risk and potential in framing their
call for an obligation to participate in medical research—the
risk that failure to participate may jeopardize the ability to
biomedicine to reach its full potential to serve the public
good.684 They argued that the fact that most of this research
would be carried out by private corporations for private profit is
not a problem because it all ultimately redounds to the public
good in the form of improved health.685 When considered in
relation to the proposed revisions to the Common Rule and the
creation of NCATS, the concept of a civic duty to help realize
the potential of biomedical research becomes even more
problematic. In the end, all these diverse initiatives serve
primarily to appropriate and transfer public value into private
hands. In this model, the public good of health exists only as
682. See Childerhose, supra note 337, at 335–36.
683. Cf. R.E. Hewitt, The European, Middle-eastern and African Society for
Biopreservation and Biobanking (ESBB): Current Status and Plans for the
Future, 2 EPMA J. 189–90 (Supp. 2011).
684. Emanuel et al., supra note 215, at 68–69.
685. Id. at 68.
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mediated through a market nexus controlled by private
corporations. In the name of actualizing the latent potential of
biomedical research, it imposes duties without rights and
distributes risks asymmetrically and always to the benefit of
corporate interests.
From biobanks to NCATS, powerful voices in the federal
government and allied private entities are asking us to place a
vast array of public resources, most notably our bodies, but also
our shared public investment in biomedical research and
development, in the service of private enterprise, all in the
name of realizing the potential of genomic medicine. This
potential may be real. Certainly, significant advances have
been made over the past few decades. But the repeated
promises made on behalf of achieving a biomedical millennium,
where the blind shall see and the lame shall walk, also serve a
political purpose of framing priorities and allocating resources
in a manner that itself has the “potential,” if you will, to
transform long-held public understandings of civic commitment
and community into privatized notions of citizenship that call
upon us to place ourselves literally at the disposal of corporate
interests.

